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ABSTRACT
Until the very late 1960s and early 1970s, there
existed a dearth in academic thought about the importance of
implementing public policies and programs. Very little had been
written addressing the "how and why" of policy execution. The
reasons for success or failure of legislative mandates attracted
little attention in the academic and governmental communities.
The bureaucratic system of U.S. government was viewed like some
sort of mysterious "black box"; once a decision had been made, it
was only a matter of waiting for the finished product -- a law, a
program, or a policy -- to be delivered in a form closely
resembling the original design.
After the initiation of the "Great Society" programs of the
Johnson Administration, much thought turned to addressing policy
implementation as a distinct and legitimate administrative and
academic endeavor. One might speculate that the emergence of
implementation as a discipline in its own right may have been
causally linked to the difficulties encountered in accomplishing
the sweeping objectives of the social programs of the 1960s.
The first section of this thesis will explore the execution
of public policy from the "how and why" perspective. In it, the
author will explore thought on the somewhat broad and amorphous
concept of "policy implementation". Topics to be examined
include:
- What are the obstacles which arise to the smooth
implementation of government policies and programs?
- What are the human factors which affect the outcome of
policies and programs?
- What are the organizational (structural) factors which
result in a policy's or program's success or failure?
2
Armed with newfound knowledge and understanding, the author,
in Section Two, will then proceed to address Massachusetts
General Laws Chapter 111F, the "right to know" law. This
exploration will involve analysis of the law's implementation
process: the major administrative actors, their duties, and,
most importantly, the obstacles that they face in the execution
of their duties.
In Section Three, the author will attempt to combine the
theoretical aspects of Section One with the reality of the case
examined in Section Two. This will be accomplished by chosing one
of the models presented -- Van Meter and Van Horn's Model of the
Policy Implementation Process -- and applying the facts of the
right to know law. This exploration will bring to light questions
concerning the utility of interpreting real-world situations from
a theoretical perspective.
Thesis Supervisor: Frank S. Jones
Title: Ford Professor of Urban Affairs,
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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SECTION ONE -- POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
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INTRODUCTION
In the late-Nineteenth and early-Twentieth Centuries, the
academic community viewed the formulation and execution of
governmental policies as a unidirectional process in which
decisions were made by those in the highest positions of
authority. The decisions and instructions of these upper-most
figures were dutifully carried out by those with increasingly
minor powers of decision-making and discretion. The top-down
model of the classical bureaucracy was viewed as the most
efficient and therefore, by rational deduction, most morally
desirous method of executing the administrative functions of
government. Until the latter years of this century, this
"classical model of public administration" was unquestioningly
embraced by intellectuals and practioners alike.
As this century draws to its conclusion, however, it can be
safely said that the rather naive, simplistic assumptions of the
classical model have been viewed with increasing skepticism. No
longer do political scientists hold dear the premise that "once a
policy has been 'made' by a government, the policy will be
implemented and the desired results of the policy will be near
1
those expected by the policymakers." Experience with numerous
governmental policies, programs, and even military actions has
produced evidence quite to the contrary.
The question then arises: why do some policies succeed
while others fail or, at best, reach a point in their progression
beyond which further advancement seems impossible? At what point
9
between policy formation and completion is there a convergence of
factors which results in eventual success, failure, or abeyance?
What are the characteristics of this, as termed by Hargrove,
"Missing Link"?
In this section, the author will examine one part of the
policy process: implementation. This section will begin with an
examination of the early "classical" perspective of policy
implementation and will then present more recent, contrasting
views of the process.
These more recent views examine various facets of the
implementation process, rejecting - to varying degrees - the
very tenets of the classical model of administration. Each
represents a step in an evolutionary progression.
The author will use this section to establish an intellectual
base or "lens" through which to view the real-world case presented
in Section Two.
10
THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF ADMINISTRATION
Three basic concepts helped shape the early "classical"
model of public administration. These concepts, formed during
the first few decades of the Twentieth Century, tended to view
administration through the somewhat optimistic and enthusiastic
eyes of the Machine Age.
Max Weber, in his writings on the "ideal" bureaucracy,
conceptualized the structural components of administrative
2
organizations in terms of a centralized, hierarchical pyramid.
These organizational pyramids were viewed by Weber as highly
rationalized structures controlled at the top by a small group of
decision-makers whose policies were dutifully executed by
"subordinate administrators whose obedience to commands should be
3
prompt, automatic and unquestioning." Weber's "ideal"
bureaucracy was an inflexible, highly ordered and specialized
organizational entity, a "firmly ordered system of super- and
subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower
4
offices by the higher ones."
To Weber's structural framework can be add9d the second
major concept. Woodrow Wilson, in his paper "The Study of
Administration", voiced the central thesis that politics and
administration are two separate and distinct activities. Wilson
stated that "the broad plans of government action are not
administrative; the detailed execution of such plans is
5
administrative." Weber's highly ordered mechanical organization
can now be viewed as a detached, neutral, professionalized and
nonpolitical entity carrying out its tasks on the basis of
11
objective principles of scientific rationality.
The third major concept, put forth by industrial engineer
Frederick W. Taylor, provided the rationale for these "objective
principles". Taylor's 1911 book, Zbg DI D9192 B1 2DIlIZ
Iana22eD'A, stressed efficiency as the basic criterion against
6
which to evaluate administrative performance.
These three major concepts -- Weber's organizational
hierarchy, Wilson's separation of politics and administration,
and Taylor's "efficiency" rationale -- were integrated by public
administrators during the 1920s and 1930s into a comprehensive
set of rational precepts to guide the administrative process.
Following the 1937 publication of Luther Gulick and Lyndall
Urwick's Ea22zz DD tbe 15igDe Dg P, the "classical'
7
theory of public administration gained widespread acceptance.
This new "science of administration" was based on an
unyielding, machinelike hierarchical structure in which
subordinate administrators were allowed very little, if any,
discretionary authority or political latitude. Because of this
top-down command structure, the classical model of policy
administration minimized the significance of implementation in
the policy process. The assumption was that once a policy
decision had been made, the policy would be executed, keeping as
closely as possible within established guidelines. Francis E.
Rourke points out that "in the traditional theory of public
administration in the United States, it was assumed that the
administrator's discretion extended only to decisions on means,
while the ends or goals of administrative action were fixed by
12
statute or by the directions of a responsible political
8
official."
In their 1980 book , b E.t 2 px9222airD,
Robert T. Nakamura and Frank Smallwood point out that the early
classical model of administration was characterized by two
central sets of assumptions. The first set dealt with the
decision-making process involved in the formulation of policies,
while the second addressed the execution of these policies.
Nakamura and Smallwood cite Charles E. Lindblom in decribing the
steps involved in the classical, rational-comprehensive approach
9
to decision-making:
1. Faced with a given problem
2. a rational man first clarifies his goals, values or
objectives, and then ranks or otherwise organizes
them in his mind;
3. he then lists all the important possible ways of --
policies for -- achieving his goals
4. and investigates all the important consequences that
would follow from each of the alternative policies,
5. at which point he is in a position to compare
consequences of each policy with goals
6. and so choose the policy with consequences most
closely matching his goals.
Nakamura and Smallwood extend Lindblom's conceptual framework
10
to introduce policy execution into the classical model:
7. An agent to carry out the policy is chosen by the
policy maker according to technical criteria (i.e.,
the perceived ability of the agent to employ the
appropriate means to accomplish the policy goals).
8. The policy is communicated to the agent as a series
of specific instructions.
9. The agent implements (carries out) the specific
instructions according to the policy guidelines
specified in the communication from the policy
maker.
13
The classical model of public administration (figure 1.)
represents a smoothly functioning, mechanistic ideal. The
bureaucracy performs like a swift and efficient automaton,
prepared to faithfully execute the commands and desires of the
topmost decision-maker. Each member of the bureaucratic machinery
is a specialized part of the whole -- a "cog" that exerts only
enough power to influence the actions of the next "cog" in line.
Each member of the organization attains and keeps position in the
hierarchy based on his or her expertise and continued competent
execution of specifically delineated tasks.
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Figure 1. The Classical Model of Administration
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The classical model of public adminstration rests on a
number of preconceptions regarding both policy formation and
policy execution. Nakamura and Smallwood enumerate several major
11
ones:
1. Policy making and policy implementation are bounded,
separated and sequential.
2. These boundaries exist between policy makers and
policy implementer because
a) there is a clear division of labor between
policy makers, who set goals, and policy
implementer, who carry out these goals;
b) policy makers are capable of stating policies
definitively because they can agree on a
priority among different goals;
c) policy implementers possess the technical
capability, the obedience, and the will to
carry out the policies specified by the policy
makers.
3. Since both policy makers and implementer accept the
boundaries between their tasks, the process of
implementation unfold in a chronological, sequential
fashion in which policy making precedes policy
implementation.
4. The decisions that are involved in the
implementation of policies are jnonpolitcal and
leghmigal in nature. It is the responsibility of
the implementer to carry out policies in a neutral,
"objective", "rational", and "scientific" fashion.
(emphasis theirs)
15
CHALLENGES TO THE CLASSICAL MODEL
Before long, it became apparent that the assumptions forming
the foundation of the classical model were overly simplistic. At
least three major developments led to a reexamination of the
model.
The first challenge arose as a result of several studies of
the decision-making process. These studies indicated that the
process was a far more complex and subtle endeavor than indicated
in the classical model. Charles E. Lindblom's 1959 article "The
Science of Muddling Through" suggested that many policies are
made during an incremental process of successive comparisons
12
rather than by means of rational comprehensive choices. Other
authors' works indicated that the information costs involved in
decision-making can be so high as to necessitate the formation of
13
decisions in conditions of extreme uncertainty. These studies
suggested that decision-making is far too complicated to involve
the types of clear-cut priority choices and specificities
characterized in the classical model.
Second, additional studies indicated that the implementation
of policy was also much more important than previously
considered. Paul Appleby's 1949 2912g AjD.l i
challenged the concept of politics as two distinct and separate
14
activities. Appleby argues that it is inaccurate to cleanly
divide the activities because administrators become involved in
the process of making policy when they apply policy "at
15
successively less abstract levels." Other studies revealed
that the process of administration is affected by an intricate
16
variety of psychological norms and bureaucratic pressures that
16
tend to take on their own distinct political lives.
The third and most recent challenge to the classical model
of public administration originated in the workaday world of
action rather than that of theory. This third influence appeared
in the mid-1960s in the form of the Great Society legislation of
Congress and President Lyndon B. Johnson. Johnson used his skill
as a legislative tactician to influence Congress' passing of a
series of diffuse policies aimed at alleviating such major social
problems as poverty, unemployment, urban decay, juvenile
17
delinquency, and racial and sexual discrimination.
It soon became apparent, however, that it was much easier to
"legitimize" social policy by initiating ambiguous legislation
that was not overly restrictive on those charged with
implementing legislative mandate. Policies were tempered by
lawmakers in order to garner as much political support as
possible. In the process, however, laws which were originally
intended to take strong stances on pressing social issues were
increasingly compromised by the granting of too much
discretionary power in the hands of bureaucrats. By the end of
the 1960s, some political scientists were calling for a return to
a more rationalized and structured approach to policy formation
and administration.
Theodore Lowi, in his book b gL LEiber aa, expresses
concern that the democratic norms of accountability and
responsiblity were being undermined by the allocation of too much
18
discretionary authority to administrative personnel. Lowi
17
puts forth the thesis that as the federal government progressed
through the Twentieth Century, regulatory activity shifted from
the specific and concrete to encompass increasingly general and
abstract concerns and behaviors. The result was an increase in
the delegation of powers to policy administrators. Lowi asserts
that, with the growing scope of legislation "the ability of
Congress to guide and control the administrator is far more
limited..., for definition by abstraction and categorization
involves philosophic and philological as well as technological
19
and empirical and just plain unpredictable dimensions."
Lowi further argues that ambiguity of laws and the resulting
growth of delegation of authority to administrators stems not
20
from technical complexity but from increased abstraction:
It is from abstraction that uncontrolled discretion
flows. Abstraction is reversible, with the increase of
knowledge, but DnAy it tba .122e2x bip 2i222 .Q
22 1. (emphasis his)
Lowi and other authors decried the state of policy decision-
making and implementation during the Johnson Administration and
beyond. They seemed to possess an almost nostalgic regard for
the "old ways" of public administration. Yet, as attractive as a
return to the classical model may have appeared, "once Pandora's
box had been opened it was not easy to close it. The previously
simplistic process of implementation would never look the same
21
again." The next step for observers was to attempt to come to
terms with, clarify, and explain the newly-discovered world of
"policy implementation".
18
CURRENT THOUGHT ON IMPLEMENTATION
Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementa.n
It was not until after the 1973 publication of Jeffrey
Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky's book, e QD1.t192 BM 92Za
Zzvpe=akiDQD in T azbinB~Dn Aze Dahes ID akiagd, that the
problems encountered in the execution of governmental mandate
22
began to receive widespread attention.
Pressman and Wildavsky present a case study coupled with
warnings and recommendations, rather than a theoretical model of
the implementation process. Their efforts centered on a detailed
analysis of the root causes of the Economic Development Agency's
failures in its attempts to provide jobs for the hard-core
unemployed in Oakland, California. After a careful exposition of
factors contributing to the experiment's shortfalls, Pressman and
Wildavsky assume a prescriptive tone, presenting a series of
23
observations and warnings:
1. Implementation should not be divorced from policy ...
(and) must not be conceived as a process that takes place
after, and independent of, the design of policy.
2. Designers of policy (must) consider direct means for
achieving their ends.
3. Consider carefully the theory that underlies your
actions.
4. Continuity of leadership is important to successful
implementation.
5. "Simplicity in policies is much to be desired ...
Simplicity can be ignored only at the peril of
breakdown."
Although Pressman and Wildavsky did not attempt to construct
an explicit theoretical model of the policy implementation
19
process, it can be inferred from their observations which
elements might be included in such a model. Though they embraced
the concept of policy implementation as a unidirectional process
in which decision makers initially formulate policy to be
executed by the intermediary implementers, their analysis broke
from the classical model. Unlike the classical model, Pressman
and Wildavsky eschew the notion that there should exist a
dichotomy between politics and administration, stressing that
policy formation and its successful implementation are
inextricably linked. Their call for a better integration, rather
than a separation, of policy design and implementation represents
an evolutionary step beyond the classical model.
Van Meter and Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process"
Donald S. Van Meter and Carl E. Van Horn, in their 1975
article "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual
Framework", utilize a model of the policy delivery system which
"identifies relationships among the diverse concerns of policy
analysts, directs attention to the determinants (and
consequences) of public policy, and gives emphasis to the often
imperfect correspondence between policies adopted and services
24
actually delivered."
Their model contains six primary variables "which shape the
25
linkage between policy and performance":
1. policy standards and objectives;
2. policy resources;
20
3. interorganizational communication and enforcement
activities;
4. characteristics of the implementing agencies;
5. economic, -social, and political conditions;
6. disposition of implementers.
interorganizational
communication and
standards 3 enforcement actvities
and
objectives
characteristics disp
of implementing of i
POLICY agencies
resources
economic, social,
and political )
conditions
osition
mplementers
Vp
Figure 2. Van Meter and Van Horn's Model of the Policy
Implementation Process.[26]
These six variables are linked, each exerting some amount of
influence, either directly or through another, on the final
outcome of the policy's implementation. It is interesting to
note that the Van Meter and Van Horn model only has one instance
where there is a true give-and-take exchange of influence between
variables -- in the case of "interorganizational communication
and enforcement activities" and "characteristics of the
implementing agencies".
21
PERFORMANCE
Policy standards and objectives are viewed as giving more
concrete form to the generalities of the legislative document.
They provide specific means for assessing program performance.
In some cases, difficulty is encountered in identifying and
measuring performance. Van Meter and Van Horn attribute this
difficulty to a policy's breadth or the "complex and far-reaching
27
nature of its goals." The stated standards and objectives may
also be ambiguous and contradictory. This may be intentional on
the part of the policy-makers in order to ensure positive
responses from actors at varying levels of the bureaucratic
organizations responsible for implementing the policy.
Policy resources may include funds or other incentives
wielded by the policy-makers and used to encourage or facilitate
implementation of policies and programs. By the granting,
withholding, or withdrawal of funding and other resources,
policy-makers as well as upper-echelon administrators attempt to
exercise control over actions of subordinate personnel.
Van Meter and Van Horn stress the importance of clear and
concise communication between actors in the policy implementation
28
process:
Standards and objectives cannot be carried out unless
they are stated with sufficient clarity so that
22
2.9.119Y .51ARdA.Ld19 AJDb QW.C.911M.9Z
implementers can know what is expected of them...In
transmitting messages downward in an organization or
from one organization to another, communicators
inevitably distort them -- both intentionally and
unintentionally. Furthermore, if different sources of
communication provide inconsistent interpretations of
standards and objectives or if the same source provides
conflicting interpretations over time, implementers
will find it even more difficult to carry out the
intentions of policy.
For implementation of policies and programs to proceed
successfully, it is often required that higher authorities
(policy-makers and upper-level administrators) have at their
disposal institutional mechanisms and procedures to increase the
likelihood that intraorganizational implementers (subordinates)
perform in keeping with a policy's standards and objectives.
Superiors have a wide range of such enforcement mechanisms.
They include the standard personnel powers of recruitment and
selection, assignment and relocation, advancement and promotion,
29
and, ultimately, dismissal. Additionally, higher authorities
are often able to use their control over budgetary allocations
and inflate or reduce monies to subordinate bureaus and field
offices in response to satisfactory or unsatisfactory
performance. Though unable to command obedience, superiors are
thus able to influence the behavior of lower-level implementers.
Two types of enforcement or follow-up activities are most
important in the context of interorganizational (or
intergovernmental) relations. First, higher-level officials can
often do much to facilitate implementation by availing
subordinated of technical advice and assistance. Lower-level
implementers may receive aid in interpreting regulations,
guidelines for structuring responses to policy initiatives, and
23
assistance obtaining physical and technical resources necessary to
carry out a policy.
Numerous factors in this component of Van Meter and Van
30
Horn's model include:
a) the size and level of competence of an agency's staff;
b) the degree of hierarchical control of subunit decisions
and processes within the implementing agencies;
c) an agency's political resources (e.g., support among
legislators and executives);
d) the vitality of an organization;
e) the degree of "open" communications (i,e, networks of
communication, and a relatively high degree of freedom
in communications with persons outside the organization)
within an organization;
f) the agency's formal and informal linkages with the
"policy-making" or "policy-enforcing" body.
These factors influence interactions both within and between
participants in the implementation process and, consequently,
influence the ability of organizations to execute policy.
Though these factors are among the least-studied by students
of public policy, Van Meter and Van Horn propose the following
questions regarding the economic, social, and political
environments affecting the jurisdiction or the organization
31
within which implementation takes place:
a) Are the economic resources available within the
implementing jurisdiction (or organization) sufficient to
24
support successful implementation?
b) To what extent (and how) will prevailing economic and
social conditions be affected by the implementation of
the policy in question?
c) What is the nature of public opinion; how salient is the
related policy issue?
d) Do elites favor or oppose implementation of the policy?
e) What is the partisan character of the implementation
jurisdiction (or organization); is there partisan
opposition or support of the policy?
f) To what extent are private interest groups mobilized in
support or opposition to the policy?
There are three elements of the implementers' response which
may affect their ability and willingness to execute the policy:
their cognition (comprehension, understanding, perception) of the
policy, the direction of their responses toward the policy
(acceptance, neutrality, rejection), and the level of intensity
of those responses.
Implementers' cognition of the general intent, as well as
the specific standards and objectives of the policy, is
important. Van Meter and Van Horn emphasize the tendency of
implementers to "screen out a clear message when the decision
32
seems to contradict deeply cherished beliefs." In such
instances of "cognitive dissonance", implementers "may attempt to
bring the displeasing message into balance with his perception of
33
what the decision ought to have been."
It is also important to note the direction of implementers'
dispositions toward a policy's standards and objectives.
25
Implementers may reject the goals contained in policies and fail
in the faithful execution of their duties. A policy's goals may
be rejected for a number of reasons: they may be in conflict with
implementers' own systems of personal values, sense of
extraorganizational loyalties, sense of self-interest, or
34
existing and preferred relationships. Van Meter and Van Horn
state that "human groups find it difficult to carry out
35
effectively acts for which they have no underlying beliefs.'
The intensity of implementers' responses to a policy may
have an effect on performance. Intense negative feelings may
lead to outright and open defiance of the policy's objectives.
In less intense circumstances, implementers negative to a policy
may assume a more common pattern of surreptitious diversion and
36
evasion. By the same token, implementers' possessing strong
positive feelings for a policy may assume more power than
necessary in their enthusiastic attempt to see the policy
successfully executed. In such instances, the assumption of
extra-jurisdictional powers may result in negative reactions from
other parties affected by the policy.
Like Pressman and Wildavsky, Van Meter and Van Horn view
policy implementation as a unidirectional process of
accomplishing the directives set forth in prior policy decisions.
They state: "it is vital that the study of implementation be
conducted longitudinally; relationships identified at one point
37
in time must not be extended causally to other time periods."
Though this view of policy implementation as a linear
process is later disputed by other authors, Van Meter and Van
26
Horn's analysis is useful in its pushing beyond the classical
perspective by noting and examining some of the personal and
psychological complexities that influence the actions of those
participating in policy implementation. These actors are now
seen as being more than cogs in the machine of bureaucracy. They
have become "flesh-and-blood participants who can play a crucial
38
role in shaping the policy process."
Smith, "The Policy Implementation Process"
In his 1973 article "The Policy Implementation Process",
Thomas B. Smith constructs a model of policy implementation in
which "policy is seen as a tension generating force in
39
society." These tensions are formed between and within
components of the policy implementation process, and the
resulting responses or "transaction patterns" may or may not
match the expectations of outcome of the policy formulators.
Occasionally, these transaction patterns become "crystallized"
into institutions. Both the transaction patterns and the
institutions may generate tensions which, by feedback to
implementers and policy-makers, may influence further action on
the implementation of the policy.
Change and Government Policy
Smith contends that in order to develop and fully comprehend
a model of implementation it is essential to view the policy
40
process from the point of view of social and political change:
By the implementation of governmental policies, old
patterns of interaction and institutions are abolished
or modified and new patterns of action and institutions
27
are created. Governmental policies may be designed to
result in sweeping changes in life styles, or they may
be incremental in nature and deviate little from past
policies. But each policy is an attempt by a
government to induce changes in patterns of interaction
between or with in institutions, groups, and/or
individuals.
These changes that Smith describes are brought about as a
result of varying degrees of tension or strain between and within
interacting components of society and politics. These tensions
are viewed as being inherent and essential characteristics of any
41
societal system:
We find built-in differences, gaps of ignorance,
misperceptions or differential perspectives, internal
changes in a component, reactive adjustments and
defenses, and the requirement of system survival
generating tensions.
In "Working Papers on the Theory of Institutionalization",
George K. Zollschan refers to societal tensions as "exigencies"
-- "a discrepancy (for a person) between a consciously or
unconsciously desired or expected state of affairs and an actual
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situation." Three main types of discrepancies may, alone or
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in combination, make up an exigency:
1. a discrepancy between a legitimate pattern or
arrangement and an actual situation;
2. a discrepancy between a prediction (or explanation
or expectation) and an observation;
3. a discrepancy between a desired objective and what
is actually achieved.
Smith cites Zollchan's model of responses to the existence of
exigencies:
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Figure 3. Zollschan's Institutionalization Model.
In Zollschan's model:
1) Tengjgs trigger a series of "phase processes", beginning
with
2) Aili - in which the existence of exigency is
recognized and goals are postulated for its removal,
prevention or amelioration. After tensions have been
recognized and articulated, they may be referred to as
"needs" which then become the focus of
3) Agign - which is defined as "locomotion toward postulated
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or unconscious goals." The natures of the tensions and
of the social and political system in which tension and
articulation occur determines whether action will or will
not take place. If action is forthcoming, the final phase
in Zollschan's model is
4) a ilization - the change in old, stable,
"crystallized patterns of interaction and/or the
substitution of newly crystallized patterns for old
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patterns."
Smith modifies Zollschan's model in order to address policy
implementation. The resulting new "model of the change process"
accepts the premise that tensions are the catalysts for
political/social activities. Smith examines and restructures the
29
articulation and action phases of Zollschan's model, however, in
favor of a more general phase and phrase which he calls
"transactions":
Tensions
in )kTransactions )Institutions
Society
Feedback Phase
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Figure 4. Smith's Model of the Change Process.
Another feature that Smith adds to the Zollschan model is the
E22azc . This feature reflects the possibility that newly
altered or created institutions or patterns of behavior may prove
to be catalysts for new series of tensions and actions. In
Smith's model of the change process
1) T.@p199i in society trigger a multifaceted phase of
2) 9 in which tensions may be articulated and may
manifest themselves in new behavioral patterns and
relationships. Some of these new patterns and
relationships may "crystallize" in the form of
3) , replacing or altering older patterns and
relationships. New tensions may be created in reaction
to these new institutions (or to any uncrystallized
transaction patterns) which may be disruptive or
supportive to the new or modified patterns of
relat.ionships. This possibility is addressed in the
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4) E22bbaIX Rbage in which new tensions begin the journey
through the change process once again.
Smith's model of the change process is an advancement from
Zollschan's model in that it takes into account the dynamic
nature of patterns and relationships which characterize societal
and political interactions. Tensions necessitate changes which result
in new or exacerbated tensions which cause still more changes, ad
infinitum.
The Policy Implementation Process
Governments act in a deliberate manner to establish new
transaction patterns or institutions or to change established
patterns within existing institutions. Governments formulate
policy to serve as tensions generating forces in society. When
policies are implemented, tensions and conflicts are experienced
by those resposible for executing the changed as well as those
affected by the policies. These tensions may cause transaction
patterns and, in some instances, the establishment of
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institutions required for the attainment of policy goals.
Smith identifies four relevant components which are
necessary to the policy implementation process: tbe iaized
P ,21gyba lax ct 9 9, tbe I2.eD±iB2 DiainD, and any
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XD~liDDM9D.14 1A911. These components comprise the core of
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the policy implementation process:
As policy is implemented, interaction within and between the
components of the policy implementation system result in
discrepancies and tensions. The tensions result in
transaction patterns -- non-permanent patterns related to
the aims and goals of the policy. The transaction patterns
may or may not result in institutionalization. Feedback in
the form of relieved tensions or increased tension is
introduced back into the tension generation matrix from
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transaction patterns and institutions.
Smith's model of the change process is thus modified to
introduce government action as well as the major components of
the policy implementation process in the roles of catalysts for
tension generation:
Implementation Target
Organization . Group
Policymakingi Policy Idealized Pol
Process
Environmental Fa
Feedback
Figure 5. Smith's Model of the Policy Process.
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Following is a closer examination of the components which
comprise Smith's model of the policy process:
The Idealized Policy
The "idealized policy" can be defined as the objective of
the policymakers' efforts. It is the idealized patterns of
interaction that policymakers are attempting to induce. Four
relevant variable types comprise the idealized policy:
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1) The EDrDiP E2lig -- the articulated statement, program,
or law that the government proposes
to implement -- the form that the
policy ultimately takes.
2) The Typc gj 2.jg4 -- three categories are used to
describe characteristics of policy:
-- policies may range from simple to
labyrinthine;
b) DInaDizzkinD -- policies are classified as
organizational or non-organizational. Organizational policies
require the modification or the establishment of formal
institutional structures. Non-organizational policies call for
the establishment of patterns of interactions outside the formal
organizational context.
c) poijgy LD.L -- policies may be distributive,
redistributive, regulatory, or emotive-symbolic in
nature.
3) Tbc Ep119y Er rxam -- the program of the policy has three
aspects:
a) 2.e.21 puppDLt -- the intensity of the
government's committment to the implementation of the
policy.
b) 99g1g4 jLjg1 -- the policy may have been
formulated as an official reaction to widespread social
needs and/or demands, or it may have been created in
governmental quarters with little outside demand or
support.
33
c) VD21gZ ZgD92 -- the policy may be broad in
nature and universal in scope, or it may be focused
upon a small geographic or social area.
4) Ib= Rg1jgg ZMggg -- the images that the policy evokes
in affected parties and society at large.
The Target Group
The target group is defined as those persons or
organizations most directly affected by the policy. They are
required during the course of the policy's implementation to
undergo some type of change in order to meet the demands of the
policy. Several factors are relevant in analysing the target
group:
1) The degree of the target group's DIga. 1zakiDD gz
2) The target group's d may be aligned in favor of
or against the policy; or it may be indifferent. The
nature of the target group's leadership is relevant.
3) The target group's prior ezpenle with governmental
policies is important. Past experiences and responses
may affect whether the reception to a policy is
compliant, rebellious, or indifferent.
The Implementing Organization
The implementing organization is typically a unit of the
governmental bureaucracy. Three key variables are relevant in
considering the implementing organization:
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1) ajDuu d E?.CggjDDC22 -- The stability of the unit's
organizational structure and the qualifications of the
personnel responsible for the policy's execution are
important in analysing the implementation process. The
greater the structure's stability and the higher the
level of its personnel's competence, the greater the
organization's capacity to implement policy.
2) Tbg gjnistixte tb bge ziLiD -- Like
the leadership of the target group, the style and nature
of the implementing organization's leadership is an
important factor in the ultimate success or failure of a
policy's execution.
3) jje V jezDtDV r..ggL~ a p~id
The organization's "implementing program" refers to the
level of intensity and care that the organization takes
in implementing policy. The organization's capacity
refers to its general ability to fulfill the requirements
of its assigned tasks.
Environmental Factors
Environmental factors are those internal and external
variables which can influence or be influenced by policy and the
policy implementation process. Differing policies may be
affected by differing cultural, social, political, and economic
factors. Smith states that "environmental factors can be thought
of as a sort of constraining corridor through which the
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implementation of policy must be forced."
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Tensions
In Smith's model of the policy process, tensions are
deliberately generated by governments so that, through their
resolution, the outcome will be the attainment of policy
objectives. There are however other, less hoped-for, tensions
which arise during the policy process. These unintended tensions
may occur both between and within the four components relevant to
policy implementation (idealized policy, target group,
implementing organization, and environmental factors). An
example of an intra-component tensions would be the discrepancy
in an implementing organization when an administrative unit is
instructed to carry out an assignment for which the unit has
insufficient personnel and economic resources. An inter-
component tension may occur between environmental factors and
idealized policy components when widespread public reaction to a
policy is hostile (the negative societal and political reaction
to urban renewal comes to mind).
Smith further describes tensions as occuring on three
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levels: individual, group and structural. The previously
described intra-component and inter-component tensions are
respectively examples of structural and group tensions. An
example of tension at the level of the individual would be an
official's inordinate use of discretion in enforcing regulations.
Smith composes a matrix to describe another aspect of
tensions. Within this "tension matrix" ten types of tensions can
occur at the three previously described levels:
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Table 1.
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Policy Implementation Tension Matrix
~Id~a1. -. ActuaL.~. Perceived1
7Ideal
Actual
Perceived
Expected
1
8
2
4
9
3
5
6
10
Following are explanations and examples of the tension types in
the matrix:
Type 1 --
Type 2 --
Type 3 --
A discrepancy occuring between an deal gtAt. &Dd
And ZQal BiJmati.DD. Example: In an ideal situation,
an administrative unit would have sufficient resources
to effectively perform its duties. The actual
situation may be that the unit is severly constrained
by budgetary shortfalls.
A discrepancy may occur between an jidal g;atc aDd a
92ej. ggjed j Example: In an income
redistribution program, the ideal would be that only
those truly in need would attempt to secure assistance.
The perceived situation may be that persons served by
the program tend to become overly comfortable with the
government's largesse and will not actively seek any
other means to improve their situations.
A discrepancy may occur between an idgal ituajtLID and
an g1gC 21192. Example: In an ideal
situation, a programy may have the aim of providing its
target group with skills training. An administrative
official may hold the expectation that only a small
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.64.S.s...&- 160 jk- A I b 0- J16-
.. - - . - -T p . A t aPe c i d-
Type 4 --
Type 5 --
Type 6 --
number of qualifying individuals will apply for the
program.
A discrepancy may occur between &Dlual znd 21?2.U2d
. Example: A member of a target group's
leadership may perceive that government officials are
assuming a lackadaisical attitude toward the
implementation of a policy. The actual situation may
be that officials are trying as best they can to
execute the policy.
A discrepancy may occur between a&jjal 3
D Example: An official from a central
office may expect that "street level" workers will
strictly follow established rules and procedures in
implementing a policy. The actuality may be that
lower-echelon administrators exercise a great deal of
discretion in their roles.
A discrepancy may occur between an cxer,td gituatgD
ADpl a Z2j;21.2 iUallD- Example: An official may
be sent out by a central office to help a lower level
governmental unit in preparing to implement a new
policy directive. The official may expect the
personnel of the lower unit to be appreciative of and
receptive to his suggestions. The lower level
personnel however may perceive the official's presence
as needless meddling and expression of the central
authority's lack of confidence in their competence.
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In addition to tensions occuring between the four previously
articulated categories, discrepancies of the same category can
occur among individuals, groups, and organizational structures.
Tensions 7, 8, 9, and 10 in the matrix are these types of
discrepancies.
The following would be an example of an intra-category
tension within the "perceived" category: A youth employment
program is created by legislators who feel that the members of
the target group are basically good-hearted individuals who only
need to be provided opportunities for self-help. The
administrators charged with implementing the program however may
perceive the client group as little more than undisciplined
toughs who are being "bought off" with the program in order to
keep city streets relatively safe.
To summarize, there are ten types of tension-inducing
discrepancies which can take place on three levels of occurence
between or within each of the four policy implementation
contextual components.
Transaction Patterns
Transaction patterns are the uncrystallized patterns of
interaction which form in response to tensions, stresses, and
strains between and within the component parts of the policy
implementation context. At this stage, the patterns have not yet
taken on the relative permanence of institutions. Some
transaction patterns never take the form of institutions, rather
they may lead directly into the feedback component.
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Institutions
Because of the dynamic nature of the policy process, it is
difficult to determine at what point interaction patterns
crystallize into institutions. Smith describes measures to serve
as guidelines in determining degrees of institutionalization of
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interaction patterns:
1) The institution's ability to survive in its environment
2) The extent to which the institution is viewed by
surrounding societal components to have value (both
autonomy and influence)
3) Whether the relationship patterns become normative for
other societal components
Smith stresses that though governments can establish
administrative organizations for the purposes of policy
implementation, the mere fact of establishment does not a priori
lead to the organization's institutionalization. He states that
"a test of an established organization's institutionality is
whether demands for the activity would be sufficient to force its
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continuance."
The time factor must be taken into account when one
considers the degree of an interaction pattern's
institutionalization. Patterns for some types of policies may
take longer to crystallize (complex, non-incremental policies)
than for others (simple, incremental policies). The temporal
characteristics of policy implementation help on in understanding
that the policy process is continuous and may or may not have an
easily identifiable endpoint.
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Feedback
The feedback phase of Smith's model addresses the fact that
transaction patterns or institutions can serve as tension-
generating entities. These new tensions may relate back to
the implementation matrix for resolution, or they may be
unresolved during the implementation process. If the tensions
are disruptive enough (they may alternatively be supportive to
the system), the only means of resolution may be through the
reformulation of policy. The feedback phase underscores the
importance of viewing the policy process as an ongoing activity
that may never have a definite end.
Like Van Meter and Van Horn, Smith has constructed a model
of the policy process which takes into account psychological and
attitudinal characteristics of actors in the policy process. His
mod is not as sophisticated in some aspects as Van Meter and Van
Horn's -- he does not, for example, explore the intensity of
attitudes held by implemeters and how these attitudes might
affect the final policy outcome. He does, however, incorporate
into his model a mechanism whereby policy may be reformulated as
a result of difficulties in execution -- the feedback loop. This
is in direct contrast to Van Meter and Van Horn's conception of
policy implementation as a linear, progressiv process.
Rein and Rabinovitz, Implmnati T
In their 1977 working paper, Martin Rein and Francine
Rabinovitz envisioned policy implementation as a process of
continuing give-and-take between participating actors:
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We posit a different view about implementation, one which
emphasizes the interrelationship between the process and the
product rather than the roles of the different actors who
dominate in a competitive field. Policy and administration,
by their nature, are continuously comingled. In this
setting, purpose is redefined at each stage of the process
toward ultimate implementation.
Rein and Rabinovitz define implementation as "l) a
declaration of government preferences, 2) mediated by a number of
actors who 3) create a circular process characterized by
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reciprocal power relations and negotiations." Actors in the
implementation process are influenced to varying degrees by
"three potentially conflicting imperatives: the legal imperative
to do what is legally required; the rational-bureaucratic
imperative to do what is rationally defensible; and the
consensual imperative to do what can attract agreement among
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contending influential parties who have a stake in the outcome."
These three potentially conflicting imperatives need a
mechanism for the resolution of tensions; Rein and Rabinovitz
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respond by introducing "the principle of circularity":
The process is not a graceful one-dimensional transition
from legislation, to guidelines, and then to auditing and
evaluations. It is, instead, circular or looping...No one
participant in the process ever really is willing to stop
intervening in other parts of the process just because his
stage had passed.
Rein and Rabinovitz' "principle of circularity" may be
viewed as the final break from the earlier hierarchical,
unidirectional classical model of policy implementation. They
place a high priority on consensual and bureaucratic initiatives
as two of the three basic "imperatives" that influence the
outcome of policy. The course of policy is no longer viewed as
being set in the intial, formulative, stages. Those actors
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responsible for the execution of policy are now viewed as
exerting, through their beliefs, actions, and reactions,
considerable influence on the outcome of policy. It is now
necessary to view implementers as key actors in the policy
process.
Nakamura and Smallwood, Xhg glitics 2j icgiQ. ImplAeAton
In their 1985 book, Robert Nakamura and Frank Smallwood
describe the policy process as occuring in "environments." They
use the environment term to minimize what they call "the
misleading tendency to characterize implementation solely as a
unidirectional phenomenon, the kind of top-down model that
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characterized the earlier, classical models." Nakamura and
Smallwood desribe environments as being constantly in flux, "but
they are not mutually exclusive since the same actors may
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participate in different roles in the different environments."
Nakamura and Smallwood describe the environments as being in
a state of flux, illustrating the dynamic nature of the policy
process. They further point out that, in the environments, a
wide variety of actors may populate a particular environment.
The three environments that are described as constituting the
policy process are Policy Formation, Policy Implementation, and
Policy Evaluation.
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linkages
N
Figure 6. Nakamura and Smallwood: Environments Influencing
Implementation [60]
Policy Formation
Environment I, Policy Formation, contains the decision-
making process -- the initial setting of goals, naming of actors
responsible for attaining those goals, putting forth the
instructions as to how those goals are to be reached, and any
determination mechanisms for measuring if the goals have been
met. .
The-policy formation environment is generally the political
arena. It contains the "legitimate" policy-makers -- legislators,
elected officials. Policy in this environment may result from
internal political (among the characters) pressures, or they may
be in response to outside pressures -- the media, social unrest,
interest groups, etc. Technically, once the decisions have been
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arenas and actors
Environment II:
Policy Implementation
made by the actor in the policy formation environment, the role
of its characters ends, and the next environment, Policy
Implementation, takes over. However, because of two-way linkages
between the environments, responses to policy implementation and
Policy Evaluation, the third environment, may take place in the
policy formation environment. This reflects, once again, the
dynamic nature of the policy process.
Policy Implementation
The second environment, Policy Implemenation, contains the
bulk, the nuts and bolts activity of the policy process. It is
in the policy implementation environment that the public at large
comes into direct contact with the policy process. It is the
actors in this environment that the public can readily identify
and react to.
In the policy implementation environment are the
administrators and "street-level bureaucrats" who are charged with
the responsibility of making the decisions of those in the policy
formation environment come to reality.
Once again, the actions of those in the policy implementation
environment may be affected by either internal situations, those
among bureaucrats, or by the presence of external pressures from
other environments in the policy process, or by forces exogenous
to the system. Actors in the policy implementation environment
may also be greatly influenced by their own perceptions and the
degree of discretion that they are allowed by the policy decision
makers in implementing programs.
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Activity in the policy implementation environment technically
ends when the formal goals set by the policy decision makers have
either been met or abandoned. Policymakers may determine that the
activities of the policy implementors should be terminated due to
success, failure, disinterest, or hostile reception by the
affected groups. Whatever the reason, the decision to terminate
the activities of the implementors is made in Environment I,
policy formation.
Policy Evaluation
The third environment, Policy Evaluation, is the 'most
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amorphous and abstract of the three." Those involved in
Environment III may also be active in the policy formation and
policy implementation environments. They may also be individuals
or groups who have been until this point totally divorced from
any of the policy activities.
Nakamura and Smallwood state that the "the process of
evaluation usually has two objectives, to determine the success
or failure of policies and/or to determine policy alternatives.
Hence, new policies may originate in this environment that are
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ultimately legitimized by the policy-makers in Environment I."
Policy evaluation serves the function of a feedback mechanism for
possible recalibration and resetting of goals by those in the
policy formation environment. It also serves those involved in
implementation as a means of determining effectiveness in
attaining prescribed goals of the decision makers and the
possible reformulation of strategies for reaching those goals.
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Communications Linkages Between Environments
The three environments are tied together by linkages of two-
way communication and compliance mechanisms. Edwards and
Sharkansksy stress the importance of communication: "The first
requirement for effective implementation is that those
responsible for carrying out a decision must know what they are
supposed to do. Orders to implement a policy must be delivered
to the appropriate personnel, and they must be consistent, clear,
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and accurate in specifying the aims of the decision makers.'
Edwards and Sharkansky further go on to state that communicating
a decision and the specifics of that decision 'is not always as
straight-forward a process as it may seem. Ignorance of
decisions and orders may result from the absence of a
communications system to accomplice the physical transmission of
orders or from the blockage of information somewhere in the
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system."
Communications Pitfalls
Nakamura and Smallwood describe the following three
potential pitfalls which can occur in communications linkages:
1. garbled messages from the senders;
2. misinterpretations by the receivers;
3. system failure in terms of transmission breakdowns,
overload, "noise', and inadequate follow-through or
68
compliance mechanisms.
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Nakamura and Smallwood describe the first pitfall, garbled
messages, as resulting from limitations of verbal and written
communications. They speak of potential ambiguity of language
coupled with other constraints that may dilute the content of a
message. Some of these constraints may include limited time
spent on communication, the use or avoidance of "forbidden"
language based on etiquette, or the use of diffuse ideological
codewords of "buzzwords" (i.e., "general welfare", "public
interest"). Messages may also be deliberately vague,
communications may be deliberately garbled as a result of
compromises that have been required in order to gain support for
the policy in the formation stage: "policy-makers may reach
consensus on very general goals, but they are unable to agree on
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the specifics on how those goals are to be achieved."
The second potential pitfall, misinterpretation of the
communication by the receiver, may or may not be unintentional.
If the messages sent by policy makers were indeed garbled, this
may lead to confusion on the part of implementers. Or, the
implementer may "misinterpret" otherwise clear messages and
commands because of the desire to promote their own interests.
Communications may be deliberately misread by implementors
because of perceived threats to the bureaucratic norms or
personal prerogatives of the implementers.
The third type of communcations pitfall described by
Nakamura and Smallwood is that of an overall communications
breakdown resulting from "the absence of effective machinery to
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transmit messages from one environment to another." As a
result of this situation, some messages may be sent to the wrong
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actors, or they may not be transmitted at all. Communications
breakdown may also result if there is an information overload --
if so much information is being transmitted that the truly
important messages and commands are lost in the communication
"noise". Another overall system failure may result from the
absence of follow-up or compliance mechanisms that can be used to
ensure that messages have been accurately received and that
implementers are attempting to take the appropriate actions
dictated by those messages.
This last variety of overall system failure brings to light
the question of how policy decision makers ensure that their
instructions will be followed. How does one determine the use of
sanctions and incentives to ensure that policy directives will be
followed as originally intended? Nakamura and Smallwood point
out that many case studies of Great Society programs indicate the
breakdown of compliance linkages as one of the "thorniest problems of
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policy implementation.'
Policy Origination and Termination
Nakamura and Smallwood point out that though it is easy to
view policy as originating in the formation environment -- the
actions of "legitimate" actors -- many of the activities in
Environment I are in reality responses to pressures external to
the policy system. So, quite often, the role of the actors in
the policy making environment is in reality that of policy
"legitimizers", making societal or other pressures official via
legal mandate. While it is possible for a policy to originate in
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any of the three environments or external to the process
altogether, the actors in the policy formation environment are
generall seen as the major source of policy initiatives.
The question of where a policy exits the system , when a
policy terminates, is even more difficult to answer. It is
assumed that once the goals of a policy have been met, the
machinery for attaining those goals will be dismantled and
efforts redirected to other endeavors. However, policies and
programs have a tendency to take on their own bureaucratic lives
as the implementers of the policy perceive it to be in their best
interests never to reach the goals set by the decision makers.
By failing to reach set objectives, the implementers attempt to
perpetuate the existence of their bureaucratic organizations.
Nakamura and Smallwood have completed the task initiated by
Rein and Rabinovitz. In describing the environments in the
policy process, they have presented a model in which all of the
actors involved participate possibly numerous times during the
progression from policy formation to completion.
50
CONCLUSION
In this section, the author has examined policy
implementation from a theoretical perspective. The classical
model of administration was presented, followed by more recent
contrasting views and models. From these models of the policy
implementation process, the author has chosen Van Metter and Van
Horn's for later use in Section Three.
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SECTION TWO -- THE MASSACHUSETTS RIGHT TO KNOW LAW
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INTRODUCTION
In this section, the author will address the implementation
process of the Massachusetts right to know law. He will examine
the roles of the various actors responsible for the execution of
the law, paying particular attention to those factors which may
prove to be obstacles to successful implementation.
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THE RIGHT TO KNOW LAW: AN OVERVIEW
What is the right to know law? Massachusetts General Laws
Chapter llF became effective on September 26, 1984. The new
"right to know law" serves to vest certain rights in employees and
community residents to learn about the presence in the workplace
and the nature and effects of toxic or hazardous substances to
which they may be exposed by reasons of the actions or operations
of any of the state's more than 128,000 employers. This law does
not serve to ban or restrict the use of substances, rather it
mandates that exposed individuals be permitted to learn about the
substances' natures. Simply put, the law might be considered
legally enforcible enlightenment.
Who is the law meant to serve? Any individual in the employ
of either a private company or a public (governmental) entity on
or after the effective date of the law "who is, has been or may be
exposed under normal conditions or foreseeable emergencies"[ ] to
any substances on the Massachusetts Substances List is covered by
the law. "Employee" includes any workers who no longer are in the
service of the employer in question but terminated their
employment after September 26, 1984.
The law also covers any individual living in a municipality
in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on or after April 1, 1985.
The rights of community residents under the law differ from those
of employees covered by the legislation. Certain issues which
arise from these differences shall be discussed further in
regarding the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering and
its role in the law.
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Lastly, the law affords certain rights of information access
to physicians treating employees or community residents. These
are physicians or emergency medical personnel in medical
emergencies who are administering health services to employees or
community residents.
Any company or governmental agency -- any non-domestic
employer in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (excepting the
federal government) -- has certain obligations under the right to
know law. The law contains provisions for certain exemptions for
research laboratories and for a manufacturer's trade secrets which
shall be discussed further in the section regarding the Department
of Public Health.
Central to the right to know law is a document known as a
Material Safety DAta Sheet (MSDS). This document contains
information on a chemical or mixture including chemical
concentrations, the effects that the substance may have on humans,
procedure for proper handling, and instructions in case of
emergencies. Every employer who has qualifying substances in his
or her workplace must submit MSDSs to the state.
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PRINCIPAL ACTORS IN THE LAW'S IMPLEMENTATION
The right to know law is executed on the state level by
three principal agencies: The Department of Public Health, the
Department of Labor and Industries, and the Department of
Environmental Quality Engineering. Each of these agencies is
responsible for a section of the law even though there is a large
degree of overlap in, if not duties themselves, then in
responsibilities in defining the parameters of the law and those
to whom it applies.
Department of Public Health
The Department of Public Health's (DPH) role is primarily
one of determining what substances are covered by the law -- what
substances must be disclosed in the MSDSs. In its duties under
the law, DPH composes and amends what is known as the
Massachusetts Substance List (MSL), which is a compendium of
approximately 1600 chemicals and chemical mixtures considered to
be toxic or hazardous to humans. DPH has the authority to
periodically amend the MSL, adding or removing names of
substances. MSL substances are listed alphabetically or
numerically, according to numbers assigned to them by the Chemical
Abstracts Service (CAS).
DPH is also charged with the responsibility of determining
which employers are exempt from the provisions of the law. Exempt
employers may include research laboratories, and, in special
instances, the DPH determines whether or not a substance covered
by the law should have "trade secret" status.
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In its role for determing reasearch laboratory exemptions,
the Department of Public Health has established stringent
guidelines which must be met by a facility or employer applying
for an exemption from certain sections of the law. The
Department grants or denies exempt status based upon criteria
spelled out in these guidelines. There is an appeal process in
the guidelines for an employer who is unsatisfied with the
finding of the Department, but of course, appealing a decision
does not guarantee the granting of an exemption.
The Department is also responsible for physician's right to
know. When a physician treating an individual suspects that an
illness might be caused by chemical substances used by an
employer, the physician may file a petition requesting
information on substances to which the patient may have been
exposed. DPH is responsible for obtaining and administering the
physicians' confidentiality form. This form, which is signed by
the treating physician, is binding on the physician in that the
doctor is not allowed to disclose any information received from
MSDSs.
Department of Labor and Industries
The Department of Labor and Industries (DLI) is repsonsible
for the employee portion of the right to know law. DLI is
responsible for enforcing the rights of employees and protecting
employees in the event that they as individuals have problems
with employers. DLI is responsible for assuring that employers
are in compliance with the information-disclosure portions of the
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law, that employers have available MSDSs for all MSL substances
in the workplace, and requires that employers label containers of
those sublstances which fall within certain weight and/or volume
guidelines. DLI is authorized to penalize employers who do not
meet with the requirements of the right to know law.
DLI is also responsible for protecting an employee from
actions by an employer which would be construed as harassment
should the employee exercise his or her rights under the law.
DLI is authorized to inspect an employer's workplace to acertain
that the employer is in compliance with the law.
The Department of Environmental Quality Engineering
The Department of Environmental Quality Engineering
(DEQE) is responsible for a great deal of the paperwork involved
in the right to know law. DEQE is charged with the responsiblity
of maintaining a file of MSDSs obtained from employers for a
period of forty years. The agency is also charged with oversight
of the community right to know section of the law. It has the
responsibility of receiving and releasing MSDS information to
community members through the citizen petition process.
Municipalities
Municipalities are required to address the right to know law
on two fronts. One, they must serve the role of employers and
meet the pertinent requirements of the law in substance
disclosure. Two, they must serve as the first line of
enforcement for the law.
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In their role as enforcers of the law, municipalities are
charged with chosing an individual -- usually the fire chief or a
member of the board of health -- whose duties are to receive
citizen petitions for the citizens' right to know process, review
those petitions for completeness, and forward those petitions to
DEQE, with a recommendation for release or non-disclosure of MSDS
information. DEQE then examines the petition for completeness
and makes a decision as to whether or not to release an MSDS to
the citizen.
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THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH (DPH)
DPH has several functions under the right to know law.
Perhaps the most important of these functions is the promulgation
and regulation of the Massachusetts Substance List (MSL), a
compilation of the more than 1600 toxic and hazardous substances
covered in the law. These substances include carcinogens
(cancer-inducing), mutagens (causing mutations in genetic
material, teratogens (resulting in birth defects) and neurotoxins
(damaging to the nervous system). The list has most recently
been updated in 1986. DPH conducts formal public hearings
whenever the MSL is updated. In these hearings the agency hears
testimony both for and against the proposed amendments to the
list.
Also among DPH's mandated responsibilities are the handling
of exemptions from the requirements of the law. It handles trade
secret exemptions as well as exemptions for research
laboratories.
Agency Staffing
Nancy Curtin, industrial hygienist for the Department of
Public Health, is the individual primarily responsible for
overseeing the exemptions for research laboratories and trade
secrets. At present there are three people involved in DPH's
section of the right to know law -- the coordinator, the
industrial hygienist, and a toxicologist. DPH is presently
involved in adding another toxicologist and another industrial
hygienist to assist the present personnel.
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Agency Funding
It was approximately seven months after right to know became
a law that program staff was hired. Part of the reason for the
lag can be directly attributed to funding problems. There was no
money appropriated for DPH's section of implementation when the
law was enacted, so other DPH personnel were "wearing many hats"
in an effort to start the implementation program while working on
their other duties in the agency. Right to know is now a
standard budget item for DPH and has recently received a doubling
of its budget. Curtin says, "We are encouraged by the fact that
they have given us the go-ahead on two new positions." The staff
presently consists of four persons, including clerks. These four
are responsible for DPH's statewide portion of the right to know
law. With the two new positions, staff size will be increased by
fifty percent to six.
The law went into effect September 1984 and Curtin was hired
in May of 1985. Until her hiring, applications for exemptions
were being accepted, but no inspections were being conducted or
determinations made. After Curtin's hiring and that of a
toxicologist, the agency spent several months formulating
procedures for implementing its portion of the right to know law.
Beginning in late August of 1985, the first few months of these
inspections were used to "fine tune" the inspection process, to
determine what did and what didn't work. By now DPH has pretty
much fallen into a routine for the inspections. It has developed
checklists for inspections purposes, and Curtin feels that things
seem to be going pretty well.
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Curtin states that implementation has been slow to get off
the ground "because we haven't had a lot of guidance from the law
or the regs, and its kind of had to be developed -- it's had to
go through our legal department several times. We'd kind of just
gotten our feet wet in the fall. I'm feeling much more confident
about going in and out of people's places or business. There
were rights of entry questions (as well as questions regarding
1
what the law allowed us to do)." Curtin feels that with the
hiring of the new industrial hygienist, the schedule can be
"beefed up".
Physician Access to Confidential Information
DPH also plays a role in assisting physician access to
confidential or trade secret information. DPH has drafted a
confidentiality agreement which manufacturers may use in
disclosing information to a physician who is treating either an
employee or a community resident covered by the law. To date,
the department has received one request from a physician for
assistance in obtaining MSDS information from a manufacturer. As
Curtin points out, the one request does not necessarily mean that
the law is not working as intended. It may be that physicians
are directly contacting and receiving MSDS information from
manufacturers and employers without the assistance of DPH. DPH
may be asked to assist the physician if the manufacturer does not
have a confidentiality agreement of its own or if the physician
is having difficulty in gathering information due to reluctance
from the manufacturer.
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Under normal circumstances, a physician would go through
either DLI or DEQE to obtain MSDS information. If the physician
is treating an employee, he or she would go through DLI. If the
physician were treating a community resident, DEQE would be the
avenue. DPH facilitates confidentiality. It provides the formal
agreement between the two parties -- the physician and the
employer or manufacturer -- to keep the released information
secret. DPH does not play an active role in the actual securing
of MSDS information.
Research Laboratory Exemptions
DPH currently has 180 applications for research laboratory
exemption. In some instances, a single application may be
submitted for an entire company which has numerous research
facilities. The present 180 applications represent 321
laboratories. There are applications which seek exemption for an
entire facility (Draper Laboratory, for example, which has
numerous individual laboratories might submit only one application
for exemption). Curtin notes that it is very difficult to
determine the number of employees working in an exempt facility.
There are two major advantages for an employer seeking
exemption from the requirements of the right to know law. The
first is that many research laboratories already have established
policies and programs for information disclosure and employee
training in health and safety. The presence of many highly-
skilled individuals working in research laboratories may negate
the requirement for state-regulated training. Curtin points out
that there are mostly doctorate-, masters-, or at least
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baccalaureate-level trained personnel working in research
laboratories. These employees are usually better trained than the
typical manufacturing employee who would come into contact with
hazardous chemical substances in an industrial workplace. In
instances such as this, the research laboratory exemption saves
employers the trouble of having to restructure their training
program which may already meet or even surpass the state's
employee right to know training regulations.
The second main reason for a laboratory to seek exemption is
the potential savings in paperwork. As Curtin states, "filing of
MSDSs for every substance that is used in the laboratory can be
2
quite laborious. Usually inventories are very large." Unless a
laboratory is part of a corporation's research and development
facility, in which case there is generally a small number of
chemicals used for very specific purposes, it will contain large
numbers of small quantities of chemical substances in small
quantities. Exemptions for research laboratories save employers
the effort of having to bring MSDSs into the specific format
required by the right to know law. It also spares the employer
the trouble of recording and retaining any diligent efforts
correspondence that might be used in trying to gather MSDS
information from manufacturers or suppliers. Otherwise, it can be
quite cumbersome for large research laboratories to send pertinent
MSDSs and information to DEQE and DLI for community and employee
right to know.
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Rejection of Exemption Applications
There are numerous reasons for the rejection of a facility's
application for exempt status. These reasons are quite clearly
stated in DPH regulations. Upon receipt of an application for
exemption, DPH inspects the laboratory to determine qualification
for exemption. The fact that DPH only has one industrial
hygienist assigned the task of inspecting all applying
laboratories creates a bit of a backlog, a problem in prompt
compliance of the law by employers.
On the application for research laboratory exemption, there
are several questions which must be answered by the employer.
These help DPH determine whether or not the facility can be
exempted from the right to know requirements. Chief among these
questions is whether or not a facility is actually a research
laboratory. This is defined as a laboratory that is involved in
research and development that does not conduct routine testing.
Quality control laboratories, for example, are not considered
research laboratories and therefore cannot qualify as exempted
facilities. Manufacturing laboratories, small scale production,
or pilot program laboratories are not exemptible under the right
to know regulations. As Curtin points out, DPH must take the
answers to questions asked on the application at face value. It
is difficult to ascertain whether a facility is used for research
and development or for quality control or other production
functions until a thorough inspection is made of the facility and
observations are made of employee activities and research notes.
DPH also examines the SIC codes of an applicant. If the SIC code
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is 2000 to 3999, that applicant is covered by OSHA regulations
governing the manufacturing segment of industry. This means that
even if a laboratory is involved in production activities, it is
exempt from the employee right to know; however, that lab still
would be required to meet DEQE regulations regarding community
right to know. OSHA has superseded all DLI regulations for
activities in the manufacturing segment of industry.
A major requirement and possible cause for rejection of an
application for exemption is the requirement that all activities
conducted in the laboratory be under the direct supervision of
technically qualified personnel. DPH considers direct supervision
to be the actual physical presence and participation of qualified
graduate-level or higher trained personnel. Curtin says, "If for
instance, you have a laboratory where you have high school diploma
(level) technicians, or B.S. technicians working without direct
supervision...not somebody sitting in a corporate office
somewhere, we don't consider that adequate. Somebody has to be
on-site and available in the event of an emergency, a problem,
3
concern about a safety or health-related issue." DPH defines
technically qualified as meeting criteria for levels of education
and experience. DPH also must have proof that employers have
provided employees with adequate information of intention to seek
research laboratory exemption. The law allows employees to submit
information to DPH if that employee does not feel that exemption
is warranted. The employer is required to post notice 21 days
prior to filing an exemption application. DPH has had
approximately one dozen situations where employees have made
submissions to the department contesting an application for
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exemption. Of these twelve research laboratories, some have had
multiple submissions from employees in the same facility. In
instances where an employee protests the application, DPH finds
itself in a very delicate situation. It must determine whether or
not the actions have been taken by a disgruntled employee who does
not like his or her boss. If the protest has been made for valid
reasons, DPH assures confidentiality for any employee protesting
the exemption application. This can be problematical during an
inspection of a facility by DPH in that the department does not
want to single out any employees for questioning and comparison
with employer statements. DPH randomly questions employees while
it is making an observational inspection of the applicant's
facilities in an effort to determine if observed actions are
typical of what takes place in the laboratory or if it is a
"performance" by the employer and employees in attempt to gain
research laboratory exemption.
DPH does not conduct unannounced inspections of facilities.
This decision was made by the department because inspectional
visits involve review of numerous documents, and it is very time-
consuming if employers are not expecting the inspectors. Another
advantage to giving advance notice of inspection is that if an
applicant facility is inadequate in some area of the requirments,
it is often the case that these inadequacies are corrected by the
time the DPH inspectors arrive. Curtin states, "Our motive is
obviously to get places to be operating in a healthy and safe
manner, and if two or three weeks advance notice before our
4
inspection is enough to get people moving, we feel that's good."
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Probably the greatest reason that DPH would reject an
exemption application is that a laboratory is not being conducted
in a healthy and safe manner. DPH rejects exemption if it
believes that the health and safety of employees working in the
laboratory is being threatened. DPH inspections of facilities are
primarily to determine the level of health and safety in the
laboratory. These inspections do not involve the taking of
samples. DPH anticipates conducting ventilation tests in the
future when the agency gets the proper equipment. A large number
of people are surprised by DPH's approach to facilities
inspection. It is generally assumed that DPH will concentrate its
efforts on inspecting and observing chemical handling in the
laboratory because that is, afterall, what the right to know law
is primarily concerning itself with. DPH however, has a very
broad mandate and has decided that it might be worthwhile to
examine all activities and aspects of research laboratories, even
if it does not directly involve the right to know law. Curtin
says, "Maybe we can get people moving and developing programs in
5
other areas."
Facilities Inspections
During an inspection, DPH notes deficiences and makes their
correction a requirement for research laboratory exemption. The
agency may make recommendations on other health related issues
that need to be addressed or that the agency feels warrants some
consideration. While these recommendations are not required to be
met for exemption purposes, DPH has found that they are usually
followed by employers. Curtin states that employers will often go
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beyond what is required of them. DPH also offers assistance, as
much as possible, to employers seeking exemption. Though the
agency does not have the staff to provide on-site consultation, it
does attempt to assist employers by distributing information on
safety equipment or related subjects.
Citation of Inadequate Facilities
The Department of Public Health enjoys a great deal of
discretion in the issuance of citations to any company that it
feels is deficient in laboratory equipment or practices. Though
this does not tie directly in with the right to know law's
implementation, DPH's powers of citation can be used a great deal
as leverage in bringing laboratories into compliance with
regulations. DPH generally does not issue citations -- "unless
its something that we feel to be an eminent threat to health, we
6
wouldn't push an issue like that." In making suggestions and
recommendations to employers DPH does not necessarily limit itself
to research laboratories. It makes information and
recommendations available to all segments of industry as well as
private citizens.
DPH has inspected approximately 60 laboratories, and is in
the process of beginning to issue determinations on those
facilities. Final determinations were being held until issues had
been cleared up regarding OSHA and the new federal hazard
communication standards. Now that DPH has clarified where it
stands in relation to the federal government's efforts, processing
of recommendations should take place at a fairly good rate.
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Determinations for Granting or Denying Exemption
DPH has not had any legal challenges to any decisions that
it has made. In determining exemption for a laboratory the agency
conducts an adjudicatory hearing so that any rejections may be
appealed. Curtin states that so far she has recommended denial
in only one case. There have been no denials of applications due
to insufficient information provided by the employer or
manufacturer, failure by employers to provide information
requested, or due to laboratories being operated in unhealthy and
unsafe manners. DPH allows time for abatement for deficiencies.
An initial period of 30 days. If an extension of time is
required, employers can ask for an additional sixty days, "so I
think we're giving people the benefit of the doubt and the
7
opportunity to clean their act up, so to speak."
The department has developed these timetable guidelines as
policy -- they are not part of the regulations. Therefore, they
are not really legally enforcible if employers are displaying good
efforts. As Curtin states, the department handles applications on
a case by case basis, but the existence of guidelines serves to
give employers and added incentive for prompt compliance with
regulations. As Curtin states, "I found that the industry people
that we're working with like them to tell them they have to do
this by this date. They don't like open-ended statements like 'as
soon as possible'...They like some guidance. It gives them goals
8
to work towards."
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Trade Secret Exemptions
DPH maintains information all the substances to which it
grants trade secret exemption. It does not, however, hold
information of a confidential nature unless the manufacturer
wishes it to. Curtin points out that DPH would rather not be in
possession of that information due to the possibility of liability
if the information were to get out and be used by a manufacturer's
competitors.
DPH has currently received 73 applications for trade secret
exemption -- that is 73 companies and 650 substances. DPH was
mandated the responsiblity of determining whether substances are
indeed trade secrets and as such should be protected with an
exemption from certain right to know requirements. A problem
arises from the fact that DPH does not require that a manufacture
disclose trade secret information. In other words, if a
manufacturer decides that the "recipe" of his product is a trade
secret, all of the chemical ingredients of the product are
protected. That manufacturer is not required by the law to
disclose any information on any substances used in its product,
even to DPH. Curtin states, "That presents a problem of course in
9
terms of our mandated responsibility."
On the application for trade secret exemption, DPH has
included a question on whether or not a product can be readily
reverse engineered -- whether a product can be taken into an
analytic laboratory and its components determined in terms of
ingredients and formulation. Curtin points out that the language
of that question also presents a problem in that "readily" is a
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rather vague term. As she states, "To a competitor, when you're
talking multi-million dollars in market, maybe 'readily' means
spending half a million dollars on laboratory facilities and
analysis. Trying to define what analytical testing would be
considered readily available ... is very difficult to determine.
Another thing is, do we accept someone's word that it is or is not
readily reversed engineered? The only way to really know is to
have an analytical chemist review the ingredients in the material
and its formulation and determine whether or not we could do that
10
in the laboratory...or actually have them give us a sample."
The result of DPH's inability to require manufacturers who
apply for trade secret exemption to disclose information on
substances in question is that there is nobody in the state
government -- DPH, DEQE, or DLI -- who knows what the chemical
components of those trade secret substances are. In other words,
the right to know law cannot touch any substance that a
manufacturer attempts to obtain a trade secret exemption for. If
a manufacturer manages to convince DPH that a substance needs to
be a protected secret, that manufacturer can be untouched by most
of the requirements of the right to know law. As Curtin says,
"Unless that manufacturer voluntarily discloses it to you (the
information, it remains a mystery) ... , we can't require it, and
DEQE would never know; they would never submit an MSDS to DEQE
because what's submitted to DEQE can be accessed through the
11
community petitioning process." Most of the other questions on
the trade secret application deal with the value to the
manufacturer of that trade secret. Questions address what share
of the market the manufacturer controls, and on what amount of
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time, money and effort the manufacturer has expended on that
substance. These are nontechnical or nonquantitative questions,
and as a result, industrial hygienists or toxicologists cannot
evaluate them properly. Legal standards exist in tort law on what
is a valid trade secret, and the federal OSHA regulations have a
definition of trade secret which the Massachusetts DPH uses.
The definition of a trade secret is in the legal realm and
DPH has no real control over what is or what is not a valid trade
secret for a manufacturer. While DPH legal counsel is attempting
to determine proper procedure for handling trade secrets, the
department is sitting on the information that it has received from
manufacturers. During this interim period, a product for which an
application for trade secret exemption has been submitted, is
treated as exempt. Until DPH either formally accepts or rejects
an application for trade secret exemption, the manufacturer is not
required to comply with the other sections of the right to know
law. "And we have 650 materials that have trade secret status in
this state until the department has the mechanism for dealing with
12
them."
Problems With the Trade Secret Exemption Process
Because she has spent the bulk of her time examining and
inspecting research laboratories, Curtin has only recently been
able to address trade secret exemption applications. In doing so,
she says that she has discovered several items in the applications
or in the process that need to be rectified. One problem stems
from confusion over items sent in to the state from manufacturers
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and employers. Many of these items were mistakenly treated as
applications for trade secret status by the staff of DPH when
these items were in fact submissions which should have been routed
to DEQE. Some packets of MSDSs which were sent from employers to
be submitted for compliance with the right to know law were
received by DPH, and because of the non-existence of a review
process, staff inadvertently assumed that they were materials for
which trade secret exemptions were being requested. As a result
of this recordkeeping error, the actual number of materials that
should be examined for trade secret exemption determination is
less than the present 650.
Another problem that DPH has encountered is that some
employers apply for trade secret exemption for materials that
they do not manufacture. These employers buy the materials from
another company and may repackage them or use them as an
ingredient in another product. Or they may use them for a
purpose different than that for which the product was originally
developed. The latest opinion from the DPH legal office is that
an employer does not necessarily have to manufacture a product to
obtain trade secret status. The employer is only required to be
the preparer of a Material Safety Data Sheet. Curtin states, "If
Dow Chemical, for instance, sent you an MSDS for one of their
products and you wish to use it or market it as your own...you
can call it something else, take responsibility for the MSDS. You
take Dow's name off of it. You are then liable for the
information provided on the MSDS, and you can withhold certain
13
information from the MSDS as trade secret." Curtin uses the
"Bazooka Bubblegum" example in which an employer is legally able
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to repackage Bazooka bubblegum and market it as an adhesive. In
doing such, the employer would be legally able to obtain trade
secret status for the product. The employer is then able to
withhold the true identity of this adhesive and be protected in
doing so from losing his or her share of the market to competitors
(the most obvious would be, of course, Bazooka Bubblegum). Though
the possibility exists for such potential abuse of trade secret
status for products, Curtin says that DPH has not received an
overly large number of applications. There have been only
isolated instances where people have applied for trade secret
status for repackaged and renamed products.
Interagency Communications Problems
Curtin states that one of the problems that DPH has
encountered has been a lack of communication between agencies.
This will hopefully be rectified as DPH gathers information and
places it in computer files. Nancy Curtin is currently working
alone in her efforts for DPH implementation of right to know, and
is too busy to attend most of the policy meetings with
representatives from DEQE and DLI. Normally, DPH has more
dealings with DEQE, but, at this time with the federal preemption
of manufacturing segments of industry, DPH is spending an
approximately equal amount of time with DLI in assigning SIC codes
to industries, etc.
Curtin states that early in the program's implementation
stage all three agencies were involved in advising manufacturers
on how to complete MSDSs. This led to difficulties in that each
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agency had its own main focus and concern -- DLI was health and
safety in the workplace, DPH was more interested in how trade
secret MSDSs were prepared and whether or not products were
registered in the state; and DEQE was more interested in looking
at all of that information and checking for compliance when MSDSs
were submitted.
Curtin states that currently communications have been
improved and that the problems are not as extensive as during the
early implementation stages of the law. Curtin states that early
in the implementation stages, the three agencies were apparently
not quite aware that they had overlapping responsibilities. She
states, "I think everybody was trying to get their programs going
and, even in terms of computerization, obviously DEQE has an
almost insurmountable task ahead of them in terms of getting the
plethora of information that they have on to some computer
terminal somewhere. On the other hand, we are also computerizing
for all the trade secret materials that we have, and I personally
didn't think about what DEQE was doing and they in turn did not
think about what I was doing and all of a sudden we are finding
out that our code numbers are not interchangeable in our files and
things like that, so that information on MSDSs that people are
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preparing for us cannot be inputed into their files properly."
She further makes the assessment that things have improved
significantly in the past sixth months. The computerization of
information is not totally complete, but DPH will be able to hook-
up into the DEQE system at some point in the near future. Curtin
states that DPH is presently in the "computer neophyte" stage in
that there is not a large amount of experience in the agency with
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the use of computers outside of word-processing functions and that
personnel must go through a training and familiarization process
for the use of computers. She states that in some ways it is good
that the DEQE system is not operational as of yet in that the
level of proficiency for DPH staff has not reached the point that
they could put the computer system to its best use.
Curtin does not feel that there are any conflicts between
the agencies over who should be responsible for the different
tasks, but that there is some amount of confusion in that when an
employer, employee or citizen calls in asnd requests information
or submits information regarding the right to know law, it is not
always clear, both to the agencies as well as the outside party,
which is the correct agency to be contacting. Curtin says, "I
think oftentimes when people call in to a given agency, maybe the
person responding to them doesn't really get what the issue is.
We get a lot of calls referred to us that, because they hinge
around a trade secret substance, the person referring them to us
thinks, 'Oh well, they just go to DPH if its trade secret,' when
in fact it may concern a trade secret substance but has nothing to
15
do with the application process or how you fill out the MSDS."
Quite often, people call in with questions who are very
confused, especially in light of the federal laws that have been
put into effect. The OHSA regulations and their preemption of DLI
in certain areas have led to much confusion from employers,
manufactures who are attempting to come into compliance with right
to know regulations. The agencies are aware of this potential
16
confusion and actively attempt to "nip that in the bud."
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Representatives from the three agencies have monthly meetings
during which they aprise each other of situations in each agency
and how they might affect other agencies, discuss mutual
problems, and address any other items that may arise.
Evaluations of Efforts
In response to queries regarding any evaluation mechanisms,
Curtin states that internally DPH does have general milestones
that they attempt to reach, i.e., a goal of so many laboratory
inspections, trade secret exemptions, or reasearch laboratory
exemptions in a given time frame. She states that she does not
know whether any of the other agencies have a similar means of
determining progress of program implementation.
Curtin states that their goal of having inspected 50
laboratories by June 1, 1986 has already been met. Those fifty
laboratories represent 11 companies. She states that she would
like to increase the frequency of inspections so that there will
be ten lab inspections per month. This is her personal goal. At
this point, DPH has been unable to increase the number of
inspections because Curtin is working alone and it is she who is
responsible for examining all applying laboratories in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. With the hiring of additional
personnel, Curtin hopes that the burden will be lifted from her
somewhat and that the frequency of laboratory inspections can
increase.
Curtin states that it is difficult to evaluate the success or
failure of right to know from DPH's point of view. She states
that it may be easier to address compliance in terms of success or
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failure if there is a change in an employer's rates of injuries,
which may be directly attributable to the proper information and
training requirements of the law. "Let's put it this way, any
measurable evidence that's out there would be evidence that we
have failed. I don't think that we would see anything regarding
our success, because basically what the process we're going
through is is to tell somebody, Your operation meets with the
intent of this law, so we're not going to require that you go
17
through all the motions prescribed by Chapter lllF."
Compliance Enforcement
DPH does not serve a regulatory role in right to know
compliance. It does not impose penalties for errors or
violations, but DPH does have the authority to grant or deny
exemption status manufacturers or to their products or to research
laboratories as a means of persuading employers to come into line
with the right to know regulations. DPH also refers violations
of the law to DLI for follow-up.
Nancy Curtin's Assessment of Right to Know
Overall, Curtin feels that the right to know law is
progressing fairly well in its implementation. She says that
though she is not completely aware of activities in DLI and DEQE,
her general impression is that the question which were asked early
on in the implementation program have been answered and that the
phone calls from employers confused over facets of the law are
dying down. With regards to the rights and benefits afforded
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employees and community residents under the law, Curtin states
that "I am very pleased that the system is set up. I am not sure
that it is being utilized. It is another one of those things that
18
is very difficult to assess."
In refering to community right to know and the petition
process, Curtin states that the number of petitions thus far
presented to DEQE is much less than originally anticipated or
hoped for, but that this may be explainable in that community
residents are obtaining information directly from employers
without the state's assistance.
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THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES (DLI)
According to Joseph Belloli, DLI Right to Know Coordinator,
the agency's role in the enforcement of the law is solely between
the employer and the employee. DLI'S activities cover three
major areas: information disclosure, employee training and
protection of employee's rights under the law.
DLI Staffing
DLI presently has a staff of 25 persons working exclusively
on the right to know law. In the department there are three
divisions working on the law: the Division of Industrial Safety,
the Division of Occupational Hygiene, and the Legal Office. In
Industrial Safety, in addition to the coordinator, there are eight
inspectors and clerical personnel. In Occupational Hygiene, there
are five assistant occupational hygienists, an engineer, and
clerical staff. In the Legal Department, there are two attorneys,
a paralegal and clerical staff. In addition to these personnel
specifically concentrating on the right to know law, Belloli has
at his disposal another forty to fifty field inspectors who are
working on other DLI activities.
Early Budget Problems
After the law was put into effect and the agencies were
assigned implementation duties, there was still no budget
specifically allocated for the execution of the law. Belloli says
that the law went into effect in September of 1984, but no monies
were forthcoming until a month later. He desribes this as an
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unusual situation in that, though the law had been signed in 1983,
it was "on the books" for a year before any appropriations were
made for its execution. The result was that DLI had to promulgate
rules and regulations relating to the law, to set up their
organizational structure for the enforcement and implementation of
the law without any specifially designated funding. Up until the
time that the agency received specific appropriations, operational
funds were diverted from other DLI programs. As Belloli says,
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they were "robbing Peter to pay Paul."
Belloli had two others in his staff in the early stages of
the right to know law, and together these three were responsible
for writing the regulations for the DLI section of the right-to-
know law. They were doing this while assigned to other programs
and functions in the agency.
Information Disclosure
The requirements for labeling of substance containers and
MSDS gathering and retention are the information disclosure part
of the law -- the employee has the right to know with what
substances he or she is working. Containers must be labeled;
employees must be allowed access to material safety data sheets
(MSDSs). An employee receives information from an MSDS by
submitting a written request to the employer, at which point the
employer has four working days to comply with the request. If
after four days, the employee is still not provided with the
information requested, then the employee has the right to refuse
to work with the substance in question and be protected by the law
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from any punitive, retaliatory, or discriminatory actions from the
employer.
Because of concerns over liability, many manufacturers and
suppliers are very careful about any information that they include
on MSDSs. They would, for example, state lower exposure
threshhold limits than OSHA would have formulated for substances.
They tend to be extra cautious in the information that they would
disclose.
Though most MSDSs are federal Occupational Health and Safety
Administration (OHSA) Form 20s, it is not required that they be
that particular piece of paperwork. They do have to contain the
same information that would be included in a form 20, but the
state law goes further than the form 20 in that MSDSs must
include Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers for listed
substances. Also required by the state law but not by the
federal law is any information of acute chronic health effects
brought on by substances as well as the preparer's signature and
the date of the MSDS's preparation. DLI considers the OSHA form
20 as prima facie evidence to right to know compliance once the
document has the required additional information.
The employer is required to exercise "diligent efforts" in
obtaining MSDS information from the manufacturers or suppliers of
chemical substances in the workplace. "Diligent effort" is
defined in the regulations as being a prompt inquiry to the
manufacturer or supplier for the information requested. If a
manufacturer or supplier refuses to cooperate with a request
and/or does not provide the information to the employer, the
employer may then file copies of communications with the
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Department of Labor and Industries as a sign of "good faith
compliance". This "good faith" absolves the employer of fault
liability in the event of further employee complaints or
petitions because the employer has actively sought to obtain the
information.
If the employer exercises diligent effort and is still
unable to obtain MSDSs from the manufacturer or supplier, he or
she then contacts DLI who then either supplies the employer with
the information in question or assists the employer in obtaining the
information for the employer. If diligent efforts have been made
by the employer, then the employee, even though still not in
possession of the information requested, loses the DLI
protections for refusal to work, provided the employer shows
proof of those efforts to the employee.
Under the regulations for labeling, any substance in a
container over one gallon or five pounds is required to be
labeled with the chemical name of the substance. If the
substance is flammable or combustible, that is, listed in the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) code, and is more
than five gallons in volume, then it is required to have an NFPA
label on the container as well. So, if it is more than one
gallon then the chemical name is required; if the container is
more than five gallons the container must have the chemical name
and, if applicable, the NFPA code.
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Employee Training
DLI is responsible for regulating employee training in the right
to know. Employee training is to be a yearly event, and
involves three sections. The first section is an explanation to
the employee of his or her rights under the law. The second part
of the training is an explanation of the material safety data
sheet (MSDS) -- what it is, what it means. The third part of
training includes review of MSDSs -- either specific documents
for employees who routinely come in contact with certain
chemicals or generic documents for employees who may come in
contact with a wide variety of substances.
The employee training portion of the law may be conducted by
outside third parties or consultants. These consultants must be
registered with DLI. One of the problems that DLI encountered
early on with using consultants for training was the lack of a
record-keeping system for determining what employers were trained
in accordance with the law's regulations. The result is that
there is no means of evaluating levels of compliance.
Federal Action and Right to Know
An issue that has arisen after the establishment of the
Massachusetts right to know law has been the introduction of new
federal regulations by OSHA which affect the manufacturing
segments of industry and the right to know requirements for these
segments. The OHSA information disclosure regulations supercede
the state regulations, but they are in some instances considerably
less stringent that the Massachusetts right to know law.
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The introduction of the OSHA regulations, however, does not
let the manufacturing segments of industry completely "off the
hook". Manufacturers are still required to comply with
requirements of the state law regarding community right to know.
The introduction of OSHA regulations does not completely
alleviate the burden on the manufacturer.
As Belloli states, the Massachusetts regulations were
introduced as the result of the failure of OSHA to provide strong
guidance in regards to information disclosure. Belloli explains
that OSHA had at one time in fact established a hazard
communication standard during the Carter Administration which was
subsequently pulled back by the Reagan Administration for
approximately three or four years of study. During this time
that the federal regulations were not in effect, many smaller
jurisdictions (states, regions, and cities) formulated their own
hazard communication standards. The present OSHA regulations
came about as a result of concern that federal regulatory powers
would be subverted by this growing number of state and regional
regulations. According to Belloli, OSHA was afraid that their
20
powers would "get away from them".
The federal law requires certain information that is not
required in the Massachusetts right to know law. An example
would be the requirement that the employer conduct hazard
assessments of certain by-products from processes in the
workplace, by-products that would result from soldering, welding,
casting, and similar activities.
OSHA also has different criteria for the establishment of
its hazardous substances list. Whereas the Massachusetts
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Substances List is a compilation of ten nationally-recognized
industry lists OSHA has promulgated two lists, the Z-list and the
cancer list. In determining placement on the Z-list, OSHA uses
certain criteria based on physical properties of substances,
chiefly flash-point and boiling-point information. The result is
that many substances which may normally not be considered
hazardous under the Massachusetts law may, due to falling within
certain parameters set by OSHA, be considered hazardous by the
federal government. Many substances exist in very small
quantities in research facilities and may not be included on the
MSL. If a substance is not included on the MSL, regardless of
its properties and actual toxicity, the state regulatory agencies
do not consider it to be hazardous.
At 600 to 800 substances, the OSHA lists are presently less
inclusive that the MSL's 1600-plus entries. However, the federal
list is open-ended and the criteria for inclusion allow for
expansion to what may eventually be thousands of chemical
substances.
As of November 1985, OSHA's hazard information disclosure
law has superceded the state law in the manufacturing segment of
industry (Standard Industrialization Classification codes 2000 to
3999). As a result, DLI is powerless to enforce their portion of
the right to know law on that section of industry. So, any
company that has an SIC code of 2000 to 3999 is responsible for
meeting the federal standards for their employees. They are
still required to meet the state laws in regards to community
right to know. DLI does not receive complaints from employees in
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the manufacturing segments of industry, rather it would refer any
to OSHA. All other segments of industry -- agriculture, retail
and wholesale, public service, construction, transportation,
health care, etc. -- are still answerable to DLI for employee
right to know.
Belloli states that though there is a move to expand the
federal regulations to include these other segments of industry,
any expansion would take a year or more and that there are other
problems involved in expanding OHSA to cover these other
segments. Belloli states that the natures of some of these
segments of industry present problems for right to know law
compliance. An example would be the construction industry's
transient nature. Employees who are constantly moving from
worksite to worksite or employer to employer are especially
difficult to train as demanded by the law.
Public-Sector Employers and Funding
DLI is also responsible for ascertaining that all public
sector employers comply with right to know regulations. These
include municipal, county and state agencies. One problem in
implementing the right to know law for municipalities is that,
because of constraints imposed by Proposition 2 1/2, any new
mandates from the state must be paid for by the state. Any costs
incurred by municipal governments in complying with the law must
be reimbursed from the state.
The right to know law is the first major legislation to fall
under the reimbursement requirements of Proposition 2 1/2, and as
such has attendant problems. One of these problems was that
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while the law required employers to start compliance with the
regulations by September 26, 1984, no funding was available from
the state to municipalities for reimbursement until February 25,
1985. This created quite a credibility problem for the state
among the municipal governments.
One problem that arose with the reimbursement procedures to
the municipalities was that when funds were finally forthcoming
from the state, they were electronically transferred to
individual town or city accounts, and communications were
apparently not specific or clear enough to the receivers. Many
municipalities found themselves with sudden windfalls in their
coffers but were not totally aware of the restrictions attached
to these funds. Another problem that arises out of the state
reimbursement requirement is that, as Belloli states, "this is an
open-ended program. We really don't know what the expenses are
going to be until an inventory is done of the workplace to see
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what chemicals are out there." Belloli further adds that some
communities have accepted the money and subsequently done nothing
with it. Some others have refused to accept the money because of
uncertainty as to the requirements of the law and reluctance to
get involved with the law. Some other communities, however, have
accepted the funds from the state and implemented their own
compliance programs and are requesting additional funds. These
communities are decidedly in the minority.
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Noncompliance by Cities and Towns
Though the law has been in effect for over a year, the
majority of Massachusetts cities and towns are not in compliance
with its requirements. Belloli states that as a result of surveys
done by personnel in has staff, DLI is planning to cite cities and
towns for noncompliance. DLI is able to impose civil and criminal
penalties against employers for wrongful or willful noncompliance
with the regulations. In the case of municipalities or other
governmental agencies, it is unclear at this point how the
penalization process will be executed. Because of the
organizational structure of many municipal governments, there may
be several "employers" who are responsible for the implementation
of right to know regulations. These could include school
committees, parks departments, public works departments, housing
authorities, fire departments, boards of selectmen, mayors, town
managers or administrators, etc. Belloli speculates that, in
order to simplify the process of imposing penalties, the
possibility exists of citing selectmen (councilors) and/or mayors.
This would be in deference to issuing multiple citations to cover
the different departments in a city or town. The penalty for
wrongful violation of the right to know regulations is $250 a day,
and if no response is made after the initial citation, the
violation becomes willful, with $500 a day penalties. The
penalties for second willful offenses are $1000 a day. Belloli
adds that fines to municipal governments for noncompliance do not
qualify as reimbursible expenses.
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DLI and Community Right to know
Though DLI is primarily concerned with employer/employee
relationship in the enforcement of the right to know law, it is
still peripherally involved in community right to know. All
employers who use, manufacture, mix, or store MSL substances must
file MSDSs with the Department of Environmental Quality
Engineering. If the employer is unable to get an MSDS from a
manufacturer or supplier for the purpose of filing with DEQE, the
employer must go through DLI. DLI is able under the law to cite a
manufacturer or supplier for failure to provide an MSDS to the
employer.
For out-of-state manufacturers or suppliers, DLI is able to
refer requests or complaints to regional OSHA offices for
rectification. OSHA requires that substances leaving
manufacturers or suppliers be labeled and have MSDSs provided.
This is an OSHA regulation, so DLI is able to use the resources of
the federal government in pressuring out-of-state manufacturers or
suppliers to provide the requested information.
Inspection of Workplaces
One aspect of the right to know law which differs from other
DLI activities is that, in order for the agency to inspect
premises for compliance with the law, the commissioner must have
an official "cause to believe" that a facility may be in
noncompliance. This is unlike other DLI activities in which
periodic inspections of facilities are the norm. This "cause to
believe" could be the result of an employee complaint or a report
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from another agency such as a fire marshal, DEQE or Civil Defense.
Once this "cause to believe" has been officially recognized by
DLI, it is able to begin action on the report or complaint.
The Division of Industrial Safety receives reports at a rate
of approximately 1,000 a day for any accident in the workplace
ranging from slips and falls to foreign bodies in the eyes to
amputations. In response to these reports, inspectors are sent
out to investigate the more serious accidents. During these
inspections, quick "right to know surveys" are conducted if
chemicals are involved in the accident or are present at the
worksite. If the inspector feels that further action should be
taken, a report is then made back to the agency. In other words,
DLI is able to generate its own "cause to believe" if necessary.
If DLI has "cause to believe" that an employer is in
noncompliance, it sends, via certified correspondence to the
employer, details of the complaint. The employer then has twenty
days to refute the charges. If after twenty days there has been
no response from the employer, or as soon as the employer
responds, and on-site visit by DLI is scheduled in order to either
confirm or refute the initial report. If the employer is found to
be in noncompliance, an office hearing is scheduled by DLI in
which attorneys for DLI act as representatives of the
commissioner. In office hearings, the employer and DLI inspectors
who have examined the workplace in question testify as to the
facts of the case, and a decision is made by the commissioner for
the granting of an extension for abatement, the imposition of
penalties, or the issuance to the employer of a cease and desist
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order. Belloli states that the number of instances where this
ajudicatory process has been necessary, "you could count them on
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your hands and toes."
One thing that is interesting to note is that, even though
there have been to this point in time relatively few instances of
violation and subsequent action by DLI, Belloli predicts that that
activity will increase in the near future once the agency
concentrates its efforts on public sector employers. Since OHSA
regulations have superceded DLI's role in enforcement for
manufacturing employers, Belloli further predicts that efforts
will step up as well in enforcement for other segments of industry
such as agriculture, health-care, transportation, etc. It is
difficult at present to estimate how much activity DLI will be
involved in for future compliance enforcement. The department's
resources are limited, and, as Belloli points out, present efforts
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have only addressed "the tip of the iceberg."
Trouble Spots With the Regulations
There are some aspects of the law that Belloli views as
troublesome and that he would like to see changed. Among these
are the confidentiality clause, which Belloli sees as causing
undue fear among employees seeking information. The
confidentiality clause is the source of much concern. There are
serious questions about whether this clause unduly restricts the
constitutional right of free speech. Belloli states "1 don't
know, I think that will someday have to be decided in the
24
courts." Industry apparently pushed for the clause in an effort
to protect itself from harassment. The confidentiality clause has
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not yet been brought up in any DLI proceedings, and the agency
tries to stay clear of the issue. Belloli states that much of the
information that one would receive from material safety data
sheets (MSDS) is available anyway in a number of technical
journals and other publications. He says that the only items
lacking in these journals and other publications that an
employer's MSDS from the manufacturer or supplier would have would
be the name of the manufacturer and any special conditions or
information that individual manufacturers put on the MSDS.
Another problem area involves the labeling requirements.
Belloli states that the labels required by the Massachusetts right
to know law, the NFPA labels, emphasize information that is most
relevant to firefighters. There are other nationally recognized
labeling standards which are acceptable by OSHA. Some of these
other standards include information of properties or aspects of
substances other than their flammability or combustibility.
Belloli states that some hygienists and engineers working in DLI
have expressed concern over the limitations of the NFPA labels.
Another aspect of the law that Belloli sees as troublesome is
the designated employee clause for municipal or public sector
employers. This clause prohibits an employee from refusing to
work after the four-day request period is up if that employee has
previously been designated as "essential service personnel". The
apparent reason for this clause was to protect the town or city's
interests in the event of disputes with fire, police, or public
works personnel, particularly during emergency situations.
25
However, as Belloli states, "I've never seen a four-day fire."
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So, one could view the essential service personnel clause as being
practically moot. As a result of this perception of the clause as
being superfluous, some agencies such as the Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority have not designated employees as
essential. Additionally, very few communities have designated
essential service employees.
The law's designation of police stations as exempt from the
requirements of the law is also a problem. Belloli speculates
that the intent of the law's creators was probably to exempt
ammunition storage rooms which are already regulated by other
state and federal agencies. However, the written regulations just
say "police stations" without any specific areas of the facilities
designated. The result of this apparent oversight is especially
troublesome when one considers that there exist in many
municipalities of the state combination police and fire stations,
and even combination police, fire and town halls. It is unclear
if in such instances, the law grants exemption to the entire
physical structure regardless of what other town departments are
housed within it?
Another aspect of the law which is not quite clear is the
MSDS retention clause. Under the regulations, an employer must
keep MSDS information on premises for a period of thirty years
after the use of substances has been halted. What is not quite
clear is the question of if an employer must update MSDSs during
that thirty year period, and, if so, does the thirty-year clock
start again with the update? Also troublesome is the question of
what happens when an employer goes out of business. Are MSDS
records to be retained of solely by the state? Does that state
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then take possession of all of the now-defunct employer's other
records?
Communication Among Agencies
Belloli's assessment of communications between DLI and DEQE
and the Department of Public Health are "excellent", especially
now that DEQE is establishing a data-base into which DLI will
have access. He apparently does not feel that any tensions exist
in working with the other agencies. Overall, Belloli is
optimistic about DLI'S the set-up with DEQE and DPH.
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THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENGINEERING
(DEQE)
DEQE's role in right to know law compliance enforcement is
twofold. According to D. Bradford Stewart, Right to Know
Coordinator for DEQE's Northeast Region, its first duty is the
collection of material safety data sheets (MSDSs) from all
employers in the state who have MSL substances in their
workplaces, with certain exceptions (domestic employers, for
example) and maintain a file of these MSDSs. The second function
of the agency is to receive and respond to citizen petitions for
right to know information.
DEQE's Staffing for Right to Know Compliance
In addition to being in charge of right to know compliance
enforcement in the Northeast region, Stewart is also managing the
computer system in the division. His right to know staff
consists of two clerical staffers who are charged with the
responsibility of examining all MSDSs that come into the office
for completeness and compliance. Stewart says, "It's drudgery,
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and I don't envy them their jobs." Stewart also has a senior
clerk in his staff and a vacant position for a junior clerk.
Stewart's staff is the largest of the four regional DEQE right to
know offices. The other regions typically have three staff
members -- the director, a clerical worker, and a mid-level
worker. All told, DEQE presently has thirteen workers dedicated
to the enforcement of its section of the right to know law.
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Early Funding Problems
A problem that arose soon after passage of the law was that
no funding existed for its implementation. A number of employers
started efforts to meet the law's requirements and began sending
MSDSs to DEQE. This created a bit of a problem as there were no
staff people available to handle incoming paperwork. MSDSs piled
up in DEQE offices.
Stewart transferred from another section of DEQE and assumed
the task of coordinator for the northeast region in October of
1984, approximately one month after the law went into effect.
Funding was not forthcoming until approximately six months later.
Stewart relays that in the earliest stages of the program, much of
the filing was done in milk crates and cardboard boxes. Stewart
further states that the job he presently holds is considered a
section chief's job, and that he and one other regional
coordinator are working in that capacity, their pay is three
salary grades lower than they should be. Funding is still a
problem for DEQE's part of the law. As Stewart states, "You have
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to fight for everything." Stewart says that the legislature is
still reluctant to fund the implementation program of the law:
"It was the governor's priority; they gave us the law, but they
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didn't give us any money to run with it."
Citizen right to know is problematic in that the expenditure
reimbursement issue is not fully understood by all municipal
officials. There are also many municipalities that are refusing
to implement their portion of the law. Certain activities of
municipalities in the capacity of right to know law implementor as
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well as employer are reimbursable. The state Executive Office of
Administration and Finance (A&F) oversees reimbursement
activities.
Formulation of procedures
Stewart and his three regional director counterparts meet
weekly with the division director, Alicia Egan, for the purpose of
discussing and formulating policies. Once policies have been
initially formulated, they are put forth before a steering
committee comprised of parties originally involved in the
negotiations for the enactment of the law. The members of the
steering committee include, for instance, persons from the
American Lung Association, from Associated Industries of
Massachusetts (AIM), from the AFL-CIO, MassPIRG, and individual
companies. This committee has no real power over decisions being
made; its role is primarily advisory.
In refering to the nature of the law's formulation, Stewart
states that there were so many people from extremely opposite
positions involved, that the compromise which was supposed to
strike a medium and satisfy all persons failed to meet that task.
Many of the results from the negotiations, such as the
confidentiality clause, are still quite troublesome. Stewart
speculates that the regulations were not as well thought-out as
they should have been, and that that will present problems because
amending an existing statute is not an easy task.
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Administrative Problems
Stewart further considers the law to be administratively to
be quite burdensome, a- "paperwork nightmare". Because there are
so many chemicals on the Massachusetts Substances List (MSL),
1600-plus, there is a tendency for employers to obtain and forward
to DEQE MSDSs on every substance used in the workplace, whether it
is included on the MSL or not. The employer turns over the
information so that the agency can do its own sorting out of
information, basically saying, "I've washed my hands of it; now
29
it's your problem."
There is a sort of mixed blessing in the fact that all
employers have not yet come into compliance with the right to
know law in that the paperwork has not yet quite reached the
gargantuan proportions that it has the potential of reaching.
Stewart states that, "if everybody that is supposed to have
submitted had submitted...this whole building would be my office.
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It would look like a library." He further goes on to speculate
that probably nobody really stopped and thought about exactly what
the magnitude of paperwork and information that would be demanded
by the law. In addition to gathering MSDSs from all employers in
the state, DEQE is required to keep those documents or copies
thereof for a period of forty years.
As DEQE computerizes its data base, only those substances on
the MSL will be accepted by the computer. Any substances which
are not on the MSL will automatically be rejected. That brings up
the question of what happens if substances are later added to the
MSL, substances for which employers have already sent MSDSs.
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DEQE has rejected these earlier MSDSs, and the question then is
whether or not DEQE saves the rejected MSDSs in anticipation of
possible later inclusion on the MSL, or does the agency ask
employers for those new MSDSs, a move that will probably present
some problems with obtaining cooperation from employers who have
already sent the information.
The Northeast is the smallest geographically of DEQE's four
regions, stretching roughly from Quincy to the New Hampshire
border to the Northborough/Acton area. It is, however, the most
densely populated region in terms of both residents and companies.
The office for the Southeast region contains a total of four four-
drawer file cabinets for employer submittals. The Northeast
region has ninety-five filing drawers full of MSDSs. Stewart
states that the large volume of submittals that comes to his
office prevents him from being able to fully process each
submittal to his satisfaction. In the case of the Southeast
office, the regional director is able to process and examine each
submission that comes in, categorize them, contact the employer by
telephone and report to the employer which submissions are
satisfactory or in what way they are deficient. Generally, it is
much easier for the directors of the other regions to maintain
better lines of communication between the enforcement agency and
the target groups, the employers.
Duplication of Efforts
Another administrative problem stems from the fact that the
vast majority of the MSDS information in DEQE files is duplicate
information. There are 1600 MSL substances. What would have been
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much more reasonable and efficient than receiving so many
duplicate MSDSs from employers (each of which have to be
individually screened for compliance) would have been, if in
passing the legislation, the state had purchased or otherwise
generated 1600 "perfect" MSDSs. These state lists could have been
numbered. That way, an employer could refer to the state list and
MSDS bank and submit a form stating that, for example, substances
31, 74, 526, 1059, and 1384 are present in a particular workplace.
This approach to filing the information would have resulted in a
significant decrease in efforts, a significant cut in the
duplication of efforts that the present law demands.
Structural Difficulties With the Law
Stewart sees some structural difficulties in the regulations.
Among those, the data base in DEQE will only list substances by
their Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) numbers and not
alphabetically by their chemical names. However, it is hoped that
once the bugs have been worked out of the computerization project,
substances will be indexed by their chemical names. It is
additionally hoped that it will be possible to index MSDS
information by employer or municipality.
Another problem is that the law has no requirements for
disclosing what amounts of substances are in the workplace. This
can be problematic in an situation such as a fire when emergency
personnel would not know whether a pint or many thousands of
gallons of a substance are present in a facility. The law also
has no requirements for disclosure of the locations in the
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workplace of MSL substances. This poses potential problems for
firefighters, civil defense personnel, and police officers in the
event of an emergency situation. So, MSDS information, while good
for situations where an employee or community resident has been
exposed to a substance, does not help emergency response personnel
to the extent that it could. Granted, this was probably not among
the original intents of the law. However, one might speculate
that it should have been since the state is going through the
effort of gathering information on hazardous substances, it might
as well direct its efforts to gathering information that would be
helpful in situations that have a greater chance of occuring and
greater potential consequences than those that the law addresses.
Stewart states that he is not in full understanding as to why the
law, which is so specific in some situations, is not as clear in
others.
There have been occasions in the past in Massachusetts where,
if information had been available on the existence of chemical
substances, their amounts, and their location in the workplace,
emergency personnel would have been much better able to assess the
situation and take action. The Lynn fire of 1981 which destroyed
a large section of that city's downtown industrial area is a good
example. Stewart states that it would have been a "perfect
situation" for utilizing a proper emergency response plan.
Firefighters would have been able to determine what buildings in
the path of the fire contained chemical substances and would have
been able to take necessary steps to either remove substances from
the fire's path or to concentrate protection efforts on those
buildings. In order for such a plan to be effective, information
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on the what substances were in the buildings, the locations of the
substances in the buildings, and the amounts of those substances
would have to have been available. Stewart states that though the
law may have been a perfect vehicle for such situations, "as it
stands, to me anyway,...it's useless for anything of that
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nature."
The Question of Public/Non-public Information
Another issue which arises and has yet to be satisfactorily
addressed is the question of what exactly is considered public
information. It is unclear at this point whether a petition is
considered public information or whether even the disclosure of a
company's compliance or noncompliance with the law is public
information. DEQE is unsure at this point whether it is even
allowed to release the names of employers who may have submitted
information to the agency. Stewart states that though he has
received several inquiries asking what companies have complied
with the law, he has been unable to disclose which employers have
complied with the law.
Community Right to Know
According to Brad Stewart, his office has received two dozen
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citizen petitions for information.
The petition process itself has numerous "sticking points".
One of these points arises with a municipality's initial efforts
to comply with the law.
Each municipality is required under the law to appoint an
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official to serve in the role of municipal coordinator. This
municipal coordinator may be either a fire chief or a member of
the board of health. Stewart points out that limiting the choices
for municipal coordinator to these two categories is especially
problematic for small communities. In many of the state's smaller
communities, fire departments are composed of citizen volunteers
and boards of health are staffed by volunteers and/or part-time
employees. One possible reason for specifically stating that the
municipal coordinator can only be a fire chief or board of health
official may be that these officials are enpowered by other laws
and regulations to enter workplaces and conduct inspections, and
that, as a result, they would have virtually unlimited access to
employer facilities.
In many instances, fire chiefs are reluctant to assume to
role of municipal coordinator because of commitments to other
duties and responsibilities (dealing with unions, hiring and
firing of personnel, etc.), and they have limited additional time
available. On the other hand, many fire chiefs have used the
powers given by the right to know regulations to collect
information on substances in all workplaces in the community.
This is not a requirement under the law, but it is allowed. Fire
chiefs do not need any special petitions or procedures to secure
this information.
The Problem of Proximity
The citizen right to know portion of the law allows community
residents to obtain information on toxic or hazardous substances
used in workplaces in their communities. The restriction that a
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citizen is only allowed to gather information from workplaces in
that citizen's community presents a potential problem for any
residents who may live near facilities which are located in
neighboring municipalities. If, for instance, a house is located
fifty feet on the Cambridge side of the Cambridge-Somerville
boundary and an industrial worksite is located fifty feet on the
Somerville side of the boundary, residents on the Cambridge side
are not allowed under the law to obtain information on any
chemical substances used in the facility on the Somerville side.
Proximity to a workplace has no bearing on the rights afforded by
the law.
"Perpetuity" of Residency
Another question that has apparently not been specifically
dealt with in the law is that of what happens to a citizen's
rights after moving from a municipal jurisdiction. In the case of
any employee's right to know, any individual working for a company
on or after September 26, 1984 is considered an employee of that
company, for purposes of the right to know law, for life. Even if
an individual has left the employ of a company after September 26,
1984, he or she is still afforded rights of MSDS access with that
employer. In the case of citizen right to know, access to MSDS
information is allowed for persons who were residents of a town on
or after April 1, 1985. It has not been specifically spelled out
if, like employees, citizens retain their rights under the law if
they leave a municipal jurisdiction. Stewart states that, to the
best of his knowledge, any petitions received from an individual
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not living in the municipality in question, regardless of whether
they were a resident of that municipality on or after April 1,
1985, is no longer considered a municipal resident.
The Petition Process
Once a community resident's eligibility has been determined,
that individual or group of individuals presents to the municipal
coordinator a petition requesting MSDS information from a specific
employer. The municipal coordinator reviews the petition for
completeness, to see if it meets certain mandated requirements,
and then forwards that petition with a recommendation for release
or non-release of MSDS information on to DEQE. At this point, the
role of the municipal coordinator has ended.
The regional office of DEQE to which the petition has been
forwarded reviews the petition, makes note of the municipal
coordinator's recommendation, and decides whether or not to accept
the recommendation. DEQE must determine which MSDSs are
pertinent, which substances in question are truly those of concern
to the citizen, and releases on those MSDSs which apply to the
substances in question. If DEQE allows the release of MSDS
information, a letter is sent granting the petitioner permission
to come to the regional office of DEQE to pick up a copy of the
pertinent MSDS.
The Confidentiality Clause
DEQE is also charged with the task of warning the citizen
petitioner of the confidential nature of the information being
released, stating in a letter that unauthorized disclosure of the
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information is punishable with fines of up to five thousand
dollars or imprisonment of up to one year, or both. This
confidentiality requirement is, as in the case of employee right
to know, quite a burden on the smooth implementation of the law.
It serves to intimidate persons who might otherwise desire
information on chemical substances used by employer's in their
community. Stewart terms the law as it stands now as the "right
to know nothing" because, though a community resident is allowed
information on chemical substances, there is nothing that the
individual can do with that information.
There are serious questions as to the constitutionality of
the confidentiality clause, and Stewart states that one group
which has recently received MSDS information has threatened to
defy the clause and release the information. So, there should be
forthcoming some legal ruling on this clause.
Rejection of Petitions
DEQE is also enpowered to reject petitions for information
that it has determined are "frivolous or harassing". Harassment
may include repeated complaints and/or petitions from the same
individual or group against a company for a process or product
that has not changed, that has been rectified, or does not exist.
Also viewed as harassing behavior would be repeated requests for
MSDSs where information on the substance in question has not
changed.
As Stewart states, frivolous can be, "I know a company a
block away, and my dog plays there, and I worry about his getting
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sick." This an unsubstantiated fear by the petitioner. If
however the dog were actually to exhibit health effects which may
be linked to the company in question, DEQE would treat the
petitioner's complaints very seriously.
A community resident requesting information on processes or
substances in a workplace submits a petition to a municipal
coordinator who then reviews it for completeness and forwards it
to DEQE. DEQE then notifies the employer via certified mail, and
the employer has four working days to contact DEQE with any
objections to the release of the information. If DEQE decides not
to release the MSDS information to the petitioner, the citizen
then has the right to appeal that decision to the commissioner of
the agency. The commissioner has the discretionary authority to
decide whether the information will then be released to the
petitioner or not. The commissioner invariably refers to the
regional official in questioning why a particular decision had
been made.
If after four working days the employer has not voiced
objections to release of the information DEQE then notifies the
petitioner that the he or she has the right to come to the
regional office and obtain copies of the pertinent MSDSs once a
release/notification form has been signed.
There seems to be a fairly widespread perception among
citizens who petition for MSDS information that the law is to help
citizens shut down offending employers or worksites in their
neighborhoods or municipalities by proving the presence of toxic
or hazardous substances. This is a misconception -- the law does
not address issues beyond the release of information to citizens
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or employees. The law does not enpower individuals to apply
pressure upon employers to cease operations or move.
If a petitioner can prove that there exists any associated
health effects possibly caused by substances used in an employer's
workplace, he or she can show the MSDS to a treating physician.
Otherwise the citizen is forbidden to disclose any information on
the MSDS to an unauthorized person. In the case of groups
demanding information, all members of the group who have signed
the nondisclosure form are allowed access to the MSDS.
Medical Emergencies
Treating physicians are permitted access to MSDSs as well.
If an emergency situation exists, the physician may bypass the
petition process and receive MSDS information either physically or
over the telephone.
There have been no provisions to make the right to know MSDS
information accessible 24 hours a day. If a medical emergency
were to arise after normal working hours, it is unclear what the
procedure would be for physicians seeking information. DEQE does
have an emergency telephone number, a 24-hour chemical spills
hotline and emergency response teams. These teams might possibly
be utilized in the future to notify pertinent DEQE personnel in
the event of a medical emergency. But, as it stands now, there
have been no provisions made to allow for emergency access to MSDS
information during non-business hours. Stewart does not consider
that the law has fully "gotten up to running speed" as of yet.
This is despite the fact that the law went into effect for
employees in 1984 and for community residents in early 1985.
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Right to Know Enforcement: DEQE and Municipalities
DEQE is beginning enforcement on cities and towns who are
not in compliance with the law's requirements, "and they're
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really kicking and screaming." Some of the most often heard
complaints from municipalities are lack of personnel, ignorance of
the law's requirements, and lack of funds. The last argument is
countered the fact that all cities and towns in the state have
received an initial appropriation from the state's Executive
Office of Administration and Finance (A&F) which was specifically
targeted for right to know activities.
Stewart states that though correspondence in regards to right
to know has been to this point sent to chief elected officials of
many municipalities (boards of selectmen), it would perhaps be
more efficient and prudent to address communications to the
executive officers (town administrators, mayors, city managers)
who are in charge of the day to day operations of cities and
towns. This may create a bit of confusion in instances where
correspondence is suddenly targetted for a different officer of
the town or city. Stewart states that he has the perception that
many officials who receive communications in regards to the right
to know law react, "oh, just another form letter from the state",
and proceed to disregard the message. Stewart states that, of the
95 cities and towns in his jurisdiction, he has recently sent 60
letters in regard to noncompliance of the regulations, and that of
those sixty letters, twenty-seven municipalities have responded by
either total or partial compliance.
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DEQE is presently in the process of preparing to enforce the
law against cities and towns that have blatantly refused to come
into compliance. Stewart states that, like DLI, DEQE will treat
any municipalities "like any other employer" in regard to the
imposition of penalties for noncompliance. DEQE is presently
waiting for a town to blatantly defy the regulations. The idea is
to make an example of that errant town and thereby prompt other
municipalities to come into conmpliance: "Then we're going to
whack somebody...it's amazing, when you whack one person, then
everbody is going to say 'uh-oh', and then they're going to do
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it." Stewart further states that it is difficult to in good
faith enforce the law against the private sector when the majority
of state's municipal employers are not in compliance.
Compliance on the State Level
Another problem exists in that no one seems to know for sure
the total number of state government workplaces. Apparently there
exists no list of all worksites that are state-owned or
controlled. This presents another potential credibility problem
when the state is not sure whether it is in compliance with the
regulations.
Employee Right to Know
Stewart states that he views the law as being most useful at
present in the DLI segment. He further states that the federal
OSHA regulations which have pre-empted the Massachusetts law in
the manufacturing segments of industry are pretty weak. Even
though DEQE can demand information from employers in the
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manufacturing segments of industry, the only real powers that DEQE
have over that segment is the receipt of MSDSs for community right
to know. So, there is really no state agency which controls the
training and labeling requirements for the manufacturing segments
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of industry, and "the federal law is damn close to voluntary.'
Obstacles to Implementation
There are still problems with program funding. The
legislature has been reluctant to adequately fund the right to
know implementation activities of any of the three agencies
involved. Stewart states that DLI probably did the best in
funding, that DPH got virtually no monies, and that DEQE, for the
amount of work required from the department, got barely adequate
funding.
There has also not been the anticipated level of public
response to the law. Instead of hundreds of petitions, Stewart's
office has received 24. In the other three regions, the number of
petitions range from none to two or three. Stewart speculates that
this poor public response is attributable to the lack of publicity
about the law -- to the public's lack of perception of the law,
and to the discouraging effect of the confidentiality clause.
The other big problem with the law with regards to the public
is its apparent lack of tangible benefits. Once a member of the
citizenry receives information on any substances in a workplace,
there is no further action that can be taken.
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Brad Stewart's Assessment of Right to Know
When asked his reaction to the general effectiveness of the
law, Stewart replied that there are some provisions in the law
which are sorely lacking or faulty. Among those provisions are
the confidentiality clause, as well as the lack of any kind of
requirement for information relating to amounts of MSL substances
and locations in the workplace of those substances, information
which would be of assistance in emergency situations. He further
states that because of the interagency problems in communications
and information transmittal that he does not envision a sound
computer data base for another two or three years.
The law does function very well from the perspective of the
employee, but Stewart states that the law has a much greater
potential. It could be used "for an excellent start on a disaster
plan." Stewart states that many cities and towns in the state are
establishing emergency disaster preparedness plans and that civil
defense personnel have attempted to obtain information from DEQE.
Because of the uncertainty of what is specifically public
information, he has not released any information to interested
civil defense authorities. Stewart observes that the
Environmental Protection Agency is actively engaged in
establishing emergency preparedness disaster plans. EPA has
released a list of 400-plus acutely toxic substances and is in the
process of helping communities establish local disaster responce
plans. Unfortunately, because of the status of information, DEQE
has been unable to help EPA in its efforts. As Stewart says in
response to inquiries from civil defense officials: "Number one,
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I can't tell you what the information is...Number two, I can't
tell you how much of it there is. And number three, the computer
isn't up anyway." The department has been having problems in
trying to establish a data base.
So, overall, the law, for its intended purposes is very much
lacking when one considers citizen right to know. For the
employee right to know, it is a bit better. But it has its
greatest potential in areas that it was not originally meant to
address. It has the potential for being great help in information
gathering an dissemination for emergency preparedness, even though
in its present form it cannot be so used. So, any conclusions
about the the law would be that though it has great potential, it
has great unrealized and unrealizable potential.
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MUNICIPALITIES AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW LAW
Town and city governments are doubly affected by the right to
know law. They serve as the first level of bureaucracy in the
citizen right to know section of the law, and they play the role
of employer -- the party being regulated -- in employee right to
know. Municipalities are placed in the situation of being both
the governing and the governed. This presents the potential for
unusual tensions in that neither of these roles which
municipalities must perform were enthusiastically assumed. The
right to know law was more or less thrust upon municipal
governments by the Commonwealth. They must serve in the
bureaucracy role by virtue of being drafted to these duties, and
they must comply with the regulations of the right to know law by
virtue of legislative fiat.
Under the right to know law, municipalities attempting to
come into compliance with both focii of the legislation encounter
many problems, in executing their duties. These potential
"sticking points", these problem areas include the reluctance of
municipal officials to assume the responsibilities demanded by the
law, the lack of clear guidance and communications from the state,
the lack of expertise and training in the requirements of the new
law, and the question of the economic cost of meeting the demands
of the law.
The author has for the past six months served as an
administrative intern in the town of North Reading, Massachusetts.
During his internship, he has been exposed to many issues
affecting the implementation of the right to know law on the
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municipal level. The issues and questions brought up in the
following section are presented from the perspective of a
municipal employee involved in the oversight and supervision of a
town's compliance with the requirements of the right to know law.
The Question of a Municipality's Incentive for Compliance
One of the first items which must be considered in a
municipality's activities for compliance with the right to know
law, both as an employer and as an enforcement mechanism, is that
of incentive. What does a town have to gain from the efforts
associated with executing its duties under the legislation? At
this point, it appears that there are more disincentives for the
town.
In its role as the first level of bureaucracy which community
residents contact in the citizen right to know section of the law,
the town must assume a heretofore unfamiliar administrative role.
The chief executive official of the town (in the case of North
Reading, the Town Administrator) must appoint the municipal
coordinator -- the official responsible for serving a liason
between community residents, the employer in question, and the
state Department of Environmental Quality Engineering.
The municipal coordinator is restricted by legislative
mandate to being either the town fire chief or a member of the
town board of health. This is an unduly restricted pool of
potential municipal coordinators. In the case of the town of
North Reading, the fire chief is reluctant to assume the role of
municipal coordinator owing to other duties which he must serve in
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his capacity as the head of the fire department. He views the
responsibilities of the law as being an unwanted burden. He has
other, more important things to be doing with his time.
Regardless of whether or not he truly does not posses the time to
serve in the role of municipal coordinator, he has expressed his
reluctance at the assumption of these duties. Quite simply, he
does not want the job. He will grudgingly at best perform his
duties as mandated by the Commonwealth.
It is very nearly impossible for the town of North Reading to
appoint a member of the board of health to the role of municipal
coordinator because the board is comprised of volunteer officers.
Members of the board are appointed by the Town Administrator and
serve one-year terms. The length of the terms for board members
presents a potential problem in that if a member of the board were
to be appointed as municipal coordinator, there would be the
question of continuity if that member were to resign or fail to be
reappointed. The town has a health agent who serves an indefinite
term. However, his is a part-time job, and, as things stand at
present, he barely has enough time to perform his current duties.
So, the town is restricted by state mandate to choose from one of
two possible sources for municipal coordinator, neither of which
is ideal. The fire- chief has been given to job of municipal
coordinator by virtue of default.
Training of Municipal Officials
Once a municipal coordinator has been appointed, the question
arises of who is responsible for the training of that official in
the requirements of the right to know law. More appropriately,
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the question may be: is anybody responsible for the training of
that official?
Early on in the life of the right to know law, the state's
Executive Office of Communities and Development was brought into
the right to know picture in order to assist towns in their
meeting of the law's regulations. EOCD was responsible for
training town and city officials in their duties both as employers
affected by the law and also as part of the bureaucracy
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responsible for the enforcement of the law.
EOCD was actively involved with the right to know law for
approximately six months -- the length of time needed for the
training component -- and then quickly distanced itself from
further involvement with the law. The legislation did not require
EOCD's involvement with right to know. The agency was another
reluctant participant in the implementation process. But none of
the three "parent" agencies -- DLI, DEQE or DPH -- seemed to be
willing at that time to take on the task of preparing communities
for meeting the law's requirements. There was an initial flurry
of activity to train municipal officials in the requirements of
the right to know law. However, it is unclear at this point what
state agency, if any, is responsible for further training of
municipal officials or for the training of any new officials.
This question is very important for the town of North Reading in
that on July 8, 1986 the town's present fire chief will resign.
The official term of his permanent replacement will not be
effective until January 1, 1987. In the the meantime the acting
fire chief will officially be charged with the role of the town's
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municipal coordinator. Who will train them?
The second question arises from the issue of who will train
the town official responsible for ascertaining that the employee
right to know segment of the law is met. This official, again
appointed by the Town Administrator, is not necessarily the
municipal coordinator. The official could be the town's
superintendent of buildings, a member of the department of public
works, the director of the DPW, or even a student intern.
Speaking from experience of one who has been, again by default,
charged with the task of overseeing the town's right to know
compliance, the author is familiar with problems caused by the
lack of any specific training or communication from the state.
The information that the author has managed to assimilate has
been, for the most part, gleaned from a disorganized stack of
papers containing various correspondence, an EOCD-generated
compliance manual, and photocopies of assorted other materials.
This is hardly the most efficient way for the higher-level
governmental agencies to assist municipal officials in their
performance of duties under the right to know law.
The question then arises, once again of continuity. What
happens when the author ends his internship and leaves the employ
of the town. Must his replacement undergo the same task of
deciphering relevant information in order to know his or her
duties under the law? This litany of shortcomings is not meant to
serve as a condemantaion of the Commonwealth's concern for
municipalities' compliance with the right to know law. On the
contrary, the author has had much fruitful contact with Brad
Stewart, the right to know coordinator of DEQE's northeast
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regional office. Mr. Stewart is responsible for overseeing right
to know compliance in 95 cities and towns in his region, and he
has many other duties as well. Doubtless, direct contact with
DEQE for training and guidance will not be the most effective if
too many of the region's municipalities start calling on Brad
Stewart at one time.
Communication Between Municipalities and the State
The issue of communications and feedback arises when one
considers municipalities and the right to know law. On this
matter, the state has been, at best, lacking. Communication in
the forms of flyers, forms and correspondence come in to various
town offices. Some go to the Town Administrator, some go to the
Department of Public Works. some to the fire deparment, and for
the most part, communications from the Commonwealth to the town
are sufficiently vague in their intent and circumlocutory in their
approach so as to cause further confusion on the very issues that
they were meant to clarify.
Clarity is a major problem with the right to know law. The
regulations put out by three separate departments of state
government are a melange of clarifications, reclarifications,
definitions, phrases, terms and overlapping points. This serves
to confuse, befuddle, annoy, and ultimately frustrate municipal
officials -- particularly those in small towns who heretofore have
only had limited contact with the intricacies of the bureaucracy
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Regulations put out by the
law are so chock full of requirements, exemptions and exceptions
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that attempts by municipalities to come into compliance with the
law's requirements seem to be exercises in futility.
There do not seem to be any official feedback mechanisms from
municipalities to the state. There are no clear channels of
communication for town officials to report to the state any
difficults encountered with the intent or the letter of the law.
The only ways for towns to communicate with the state are either
by calling or otherwise contacting a state official, with no
certainty of reaching the appropriate official, with questions,
comments or complaints. Or the town may simply not perform its
required duties. In that case, the appropriate state official
will eventually contact the town itself. Once again, this is
hardly the most efficient means of implementing the right to know
law.
Municipalities and the Problem of Inadequate Staffing
Then there is the issue of a municipality's staffing and
personnel. Many towns, smaller towns in particular, must place
the right to know law low on their priority list due to lack of
appropriate staffing to meet the law's compliance requirements.
Coming into compliance with the right to know law as an employer
requires a great deal of time and effort -- substances must be
inventoried, manufacturers and suppliers must be contacted, MSDSs
must be inspected and completed, containers must be labeled,
employees must be trained, guidelines for the workplace must be
established, and contact must be initiated and hopefully
maintained between the municipality and the applicable departments
of the Commonwealth. This is no small task. Many towns just do
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not have the staff to meet the requirements of the right to know
law and what staff they do have is too busy with other, day-to-
day, duties.
The Problem of the Law's Scope
The physical scope of area that municipalities must address
in meeting the employer requirements of the right to know law are
seemingly as boundless as the regulations. All town departments,
all town employees, are covered by the law. This includes
everything from workers performing clerical functions in town hall
to groundskeepers for town recreation lands to the school
department cafeteria personnel to police officers to public works
employees working in the town water treatment facility.
The regulations for right to know define "workplace" for
towns as being all properties either wholly owned or controlled by
the municipality. In order to inventory chemical substances
present in the workplace, town officials must inspect all
departments and their facilities and all town property for
chemical substances. Workplace is defined for police officers and
firefighters as being their entire jurisdictions. If, for
example, a police officer is exposed to a chemical substance while
performing his or her duties and that substance is on the property
of a private employer, the town has the responsibility to the
officer of obtaining MSDS information for the officer from the
employer. As the reader can see, the potential exists for the
town official responsible for employee right to know to be quite
overburdened in paperwork
127
Funding Problems
A big issue, and one which has received very much attention
from municipalities is that of money. Under Proposition 2 1/2,
the Massachusetts law limiting the size of a municipality's tax
increases, the Commonwealth has been charged with the
responsiblilty of funding any new legislative mandates. The
state, through the Executive Office of Administration and Finance,
reimburses municipalities for costs incurred in the implementation
of the right to know law. This includes any costs incurred by the
town fulfilling its role as both employer and as municipal
coordinator. This sounds just fine, except that, in order for the
town to be reimbursed, the money must be spent. Many towns do not
have or are reluctant to spend any monies for the implementation
of the right to know law. Their reluctance is for te most part
well-founded in that the Commonwealth has devised a rather complex
method of determining which expenditures are indeed reimbursible.
A town may in good faith incur expenses which it later finds out
will not be reimbursed.
As of March of 1986, the Commonwealth was still clarifying
which activities by municipalities are reimbursible. Another
problem is that state reimburements are only made four times a
year. A town's requests for reimbursements must be made
quarterly. As one can imagine, municipal officials are reluctant
to spend money, especially in these economic times, with no
definite guarantee that expenses will be reimbursed.
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The Problem of Perception
Finally, there is the issue of perceptions and images of the
law. Towns have a tendency to view new regulations coming from
the state-level with more than a small amount of suspicion.
Probably one of the chief questions and perception is what does
the law do for the town of North Reading? What benefits does the
town receive from the law, and, for those benefits that the town
does receive, are they enough to justify the costs in terms of
staff time, paperwork and general aggravation. Does the law
provide for the town sufficient "bang for the buck". At this
point, the verdict would have to be in the negative.
The Question of Benefit
Though the law does provide some very real benefits to the
town as an employer, the regulations are so encumbered by what can
be perceived to be extraneous requirements and guidelines that the
municipal official charged with implementing the law can look at
it at arm's length and see that it requires too much effort for
compliance. This is unfortunate in that, as Brad Stewart pointed
out, the law has the potential for providing great benefit in the
future if it is allowed to evolve unencumbered.
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TYING IT ALL TOGETHER: ISSUES ARISING FOR TBE ACTORS
FEDERAL -
OSHA pre-emption of DLI (state) authority in employee
right to know for manufacturing segment of industry
STATE -
Funding for law's implementation slow in coming and
generally perceived as inadequate
State agencies still not in compliance with employee
right to know (how to in good faith prosecute private
employers?)
Inadequate staffing levels
Timetable for regulation promulgation/compliance
unrealistic
Ambiguous language used in regulations
Confidentiality agreement troublesome (difficulty
in determining what is public and what is non-public
information)
MUNICIPAL -
Participating "involuntarily"
Cost of implementation -- funds to be reimbursed by the
state, but scope/procedures still not clear to all
municipalities
Restricted pool from which to draw municipal
coordinators
Communication between state and municipalities often
disjointed and confusing
EMPLOYERS -
Cost, in money and effort, of meeting requirements
Perception of law as needless harassment by
environmentalists, public interest groups, labor unions
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EMPLOYEES/RESIDENTS -
Virtually no knowledge of law's existence and rights
protected under the law
No clear, tangible benefit from the law (what does
one do with the information?)
Confidentiality agreement discourages utilization of law
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TYING IT ALL TOGITHERs INTZRACTIONS BETWEEN ACTORS
OSHA -
EMPLOYERS - manufacturing only - OSHA enforces federal
regulations for worker right to know
EMPLOYEES - manufacturing only - OSHA protects workers'
rights
DLI - OSHA assists DLI in obtaining MSDS information from
out-of-state sources
DLI -
OSHA - DLI receives assistance
DEQE - shared enforcement roles
DPH - shared enforcement roles
EMPLOYERS - DLI enforces worker right-to-know for
non-manufacturing industries; helps employers in
obtaining MSDSs from sources
EMPLOYEES - DLI protects workers' rights under right to know
law (non-manufacturing only)
DPH -
DLI - shared enforcement roles
DEQE - shared enforcement roles
EMPLOYERS - DPH grants research laboratory and trade secret
exemptions
PHYSICIANS - DPH provides confidentiality agreement between
employers and treating physicians
DEQE -
DPH - shared enforcement roles
DLI - shared enforcement roles
MUNICIPAL COORDINATORS - DEQE receives citizen petitions
through municipal coordinators
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EMPLOYERS - DEQE receives MSDSs from all employers
COMMUNITY RESIDENTS - DEQE releases MSDS information to
residents
PHYSICIANS - DEQE provides MSDS information to medical
personnel in emergencies
EMPLOYERS -
OSHA - (manufacturing) employers must meet federal hazard
communication standard; no DLI control
DLI - (non -manufacturing) employers must meet requirements
set out by DLI for employee right
to know
DEQE - employers must comply with DEQE regulations for
community right to know; must send MSDSs to DEQE
DPH - DPH grants research laboratory and trade secret
exemptions
MUNICIPAL COORDINATOR - inspects workplace; can receive MSDSs
from employers; notifies employer of
citizen petition
PHYSICIANS - employers allow the release of MSDSs to
physicians after the signing of confideniality
agreement
EMPLOYEES - (non-manufacturing) employer must supply MSDS
information on demand, must label containers,
and must train employees;
(manufacturing) employer must comply with OSHA
regulations
COMMUNITY RESIDENTS - employers have option of releasing MSDS
information directly to residents
MUNICIPAL COORDINATORS -
DEQE - municipal coordinator forwards citizen petitions
to DEQE
EMPLOYERS - municipal coordinators have access to inspect
workplaces
COMMUNITY RESIDENTS - municipal coordinator inspects citizen
petitions and forwards them to DEQE
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EMPLOYEES -
OSHA - manufacturing employees protected by OSHA hazard
communication standard
DLI - non-manufacturing employees have rights
protected by DLI
EMPLOYERS - employers must follow regulations in meeting
employee requests for information; employers
must train employees as to rights
PHYSICIANS - treating physicians may act as an employee's
representative
COMMUNITY RESIDENTS -
DEQE - community residents receive MSDS information from DEQE
MUNICIPAL COORDINATOR - residents must submit a petition for
information to municipal coordinator
EMPLOYERS - employer can release MSDS information to
community residents if it so chooses
PHYSICIANS - treating physicians may act on residents'
behalf
TREATING PHYSICIANS -
DPH - confidentiality agreement between physician and
employer
DEQE - physicians may directly obtain MSDS information in
emergency situations
EMPLOYERS - MSDS information after signing confidentiality
agreement
EMPLOYEES - treating physician may act as representative
for employee
COMMUNITY RESIDENT - treating physician may act as
representative for community resident
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OSHA
MUNICIPAL
OORDINATOR
MANUFACTURING
EMPLOYER
-MANUFACTURING
EMPLOYER
PHYSICIAN . I NON-MANUFACTURING
EMPLOYEE
COMMUNITY RESIDENT MANUFACTURING
EMPLOYEE
Figure 7. The Right to Know Law: Interactions Between Parties
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CONCLUSION
As we have seen in previous sections, implementation of a
policy is neither an easy nor an automatic occurence. There are
many pitfalls along the way to successful policy execution.
Sometimes these are successfully skirted or overcome, but often
these obstacles to implementation have deleterious and
irreversible consequences on the implementation of the policy.
Occasionally, through feedback mechanisms, these obstacles are met
and surpassed.
What about the Massachusetts Right to Know law? How does
one evaluate the policy and its implementation program?
Unfortunately, not very well.
The law as policy has several inherent flaws, and the scheme
for implementation has more potential problems than anyone would
dream possible in a piece of passed legislation.
The structuring of the law among three state agencies -- DLI,
DPH, and DEQE -- lays the groundwork for confusion for municipal
level administrators as well as those attempting to comply with
the law. Confusion results from questions such as who
communicates with whom regarding different questions. The
regulations are so fragmented and complex that compliance with the
law demands/requires that many municipalities and employers in the
state hire the services of professional "right-to-know law
implementers"/consultants. As Ken Gieser points out in his
unpublished paper, "Right to Know as Social Regulation", one of
the effects of the law has been a growth in the hazardous
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waste/hazardous substances disclosure industry.
The regulations for the law are so very complex that it
requires a tremendous amount of effort for the municipal officials
who are charged by the state to participate in the enforcement of
the law. It is often very difficult for municipal officials to
carry out their required tasks. Also, because of many of the
municipal officials involved in RTK enforcement are at best
unwilling or reluctant agents of the Commonwealth in this law,
their effectiveness at implementing the law will potentially be
greatly compromised.
Municipal officials are provided with no real incentives to
follow the regulations -- no positive incentives. All that the
state can do is threaten, coerce or cajole compliance out of
municipal officials. This is not the original intent of the law.
The regulations of the law, while seemingly exhaustive, have
the tendency to be vague on key points. As Geiser pointed out,
one of these problems is in community right to know. If a citizen
decides that he or she would like to find out about potentially
hazardous or toxic substances in a workplace, the citizen would be
required to go through two or more steps in the bureaucratic
process before being told yes or no, that they may or may not
receive the requested information. This was not the intent of the
law's originators, according to Ken Geiser. The original intent
was merely for a citizen to have the right to directly request and
receive from an employer information on substances used in that
employer's particular workplace. What the authors of the
suiequent bill managed to do was to switch the law from, as
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Geiser says, a "rights" law to an "regulatory" law. The state
has taken a much more active role in the life of the law than was
originally intended or desired by the bill's original sponsors.
One of the big problems of the right to know law seems to be
the absence of any evaluation mechanisms, any means of determining
levels of compliance as well as determining what the exact effect
of the law may be.
The confidentially clause serves as an enormous disincentive
for persons seeking information. Information is by its very
conceptual nature meant to be shared, to be spread from person to
person. Yet the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has seen fit to
choose a course that is totally antithetical to the Constitutional
right of free speech. This is more characteristic of the Soviet
State than the "Cradle of Liberty".
The law will never be fully implemented if the Legislature
does not "put its money where its mouth is". Inadequate funding
may be the demise of the right to know law. If a law is going to
be passed, then the lawmakers should be prepared to display some
commitment.
In its present form, the right to know law is unnecessarily
limited in its focus. For the potential benefits it promises, it
requires too much effort. It would not be unreasonable to amend
the law in order to provide for its use in the event of natural or
man-made disasters.
There are some very capable and committed individuals working
for the state to implement the right to know law. It is
unfortunate that the nature and structure of the law does not
allow them to utilize their energies and talents to the utmost.
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SECTION THREE -- COMBINING THEORY AND REALITY
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INTRODUCTION
In this final section, the author will apply Van Meter and
Van Horn's model of policy implementation to the real-world case
of the right to know law. The conflicts identified in the model
will be compared with those actually encountered in the
implementation of the law. This section will examine the
utility of viewing actual situations from a theoretical
perspective. Questions will also be raised if, by utilizing the
theoretical base, an estimation can be hazarded regardiog the
eventual success or failure of the law's implementation program.
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APPLYING VAN METER AND VAN HORN'S MODEL TO THE RIGHT TO KNOW LAW
We shall examine the right to know law from the perspective
of Van Meter and Van Horn's six variables:
1. policy standards and objectives
2. policy resources
3. interorganizational communication and enforcement
activities
4. characteristics of the implementing agency
5. economic, social, and political conditions
6. the disposition of the implementers
It became very apparent very early in right to know's life
that its implementation would be severely affected by the
reluctance of the state legislature to release funding. Nancy
Curtin of DPH, Joe Belloli of DLI, and DEQE's Brad Stewart have
all pointed to this early lack of resources as presenting major
obstacles to the smooth execution of the law. Though the law went
into effect September 26, 1984, state officials received no funds
for implementation until spring 1985. The J D 2g lb2, in a
January 22, 1985 story, reported how, despite a $1.3 million set-
aside for implementation of right to know, only $533,000 had been
released, all to DLI.
Later appropriations from the state legislature were made to
alleviate the problem, but as DEQE Commissioner S. Russell Sylva
2
complained to the lQb.e, that "may be too little too late." The
same Cl.g] article described how a Rhode Island consulting firm,
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under a $68,000 contract to train municipal coordinators, had
3
threatened to withdraw its services for lack of payment.
As late as April.1985, more that six months after the law
went into effect, municipal officials were complaining about the
state's failure in providing necessary money and training. In an
article in the DjgtgD ngkg, Holden Town Manager William Kennedy
states, "We have no money. We have no training. We have no
guidelines, which are all the things the state has said they would
provide. I would raise the question as to whether the statute has
4
been implemented."
The first question to consider is "how does one evalute the
implementation of right to know in terms of meeting its goals?"
This is not a simple question, and it is made all the more
daunting when one realizes that there exist no real mechanisms for
determining success or failure of the law. Granted, DLI and DEQE
can examine their records to determine which employers have
complied with the letter of the law -- who has submitted MSDSs,
who has held training sessions, who has labeled containers.
But the fundamental question of whether the law's ostensible
beneficiaries (employees and residents) have truly been helped by
the law goes, and will continue to go, unanswered. No mechanisms
exist for determining the extent of resident or employee awareness
of the law or even how many employees have requested MSDS
information. It would surely be folly to assume that so few
requests have been made for state assistance due to a sudden surge
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of philanthropy on the part of the state's 128,000-plus employes.
Int aaza~tional Comuication AlD Er R AckiHLAS.6
Communication between the state and other actor in right to
know presents a problem. Many employers are still not completely
sure of what their duties and responsibilities are. The EAkten
Glake, was reporting of the need, five months after the law went
5
into effect, for "a massive education program."
On the municipal level, many actors involved in citizen right
to know are still unclear as to their duties. This uncertainty,
combined with other factors such as the difficulties associated
with cost reimbursement, has resulted in municipalities' falling
short of meeting their obligations.
Another communication problem between the state and
municipalities is the difficulty that officials have, especially
in smaller towns, of determining which responsiblities are
associated with the town's role as employer and which are
associated with the town's role as agent of the enforcement
process. Confusion exists as to which state agency is relevant
for requesting assistance. Though this may seem to be an easily-
solved situation -- state agencies are very willing to refer
questions to one another -- municipal officials are reluctant to
appear foolish by possibly contacting the wrong agency. It is
easier to just ignore the problem, so no action is taken.
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Enforcement presents a problem. At this point the state is
generally reluctant to impose penalties on employers not in
compliance with the law. This is partially because of problems
associated with establishing the implementation process. The late
release of funds to agencies resulted in the state's starting at a
disadvantage. Agencies have been playing "catch-up" and have not
yet reached the point where they can effectively pursue errant
employers. Additionally, it is still unknown the level of
compliance accomplished by the state as employer. It causes a
bit of a credibility problem to penalize a company for failing to
accomplish something of which the state has also fallen short.
Charcesic 95 bg 222&19k222
Van Meter and Van Horn describe several factors as
influencing actions between and within agencies:
a) size and level of competence of an agency's staff:
On the state level, staffing presents problems. Because of
budgetary constraints, agencies are unable to hire an adequate
number of persons to efficiently monitor compliance, process
paperwork, or assist employers in compliance.
If, for instance, the fifty DLI inspectors at Joe Belloli's
disposal were to monitor all employers in the state for
compliance (inspect workplaces to ascertain the presence of MSL
chemicals, check for properly labeled containers, and check to
make sure employees are properly trained) and each managed to
perform five inspections per day,'it would take over two years to
complete just the initial inspections. This is not taking into
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account the fact that the inspectors are working on other DLI
business as well. Nancy Curtin and Brad Stewart also relate the
problems that DPH and DEQE face due to inadequate staff size.
On the municipal level, competence of actors presents a
major problem. Training of municipal coordinators as well as
officials responsible for overseeing (town as employer)
compliance is inconsistent from town to town.
b) the degree of hierarchical control of subunit decisions and
process within the implementing agencies:
The major problem in this area lies in the state's attempts
to guide the actions of municipal officials. The state offers no
positive incentives to towns and cities. All it can do is use
the threat of punitive action in its efforts.
c) an agency's political resources:
Politically, right to know enjoys all manner of support.
The governor has enthusiastically hailed it as the best such law
6
in the nation. The legislature was solidly behind it during
its inception. The groups that lobbied for various versions of
the law grudgingly accepted it in its present form. The problems
came when funds had to appropriated.
d) the vitality of an organization:
There do not appear to be any problems in this area.
e) the degree of "open" communications within an organization:
Again, there seem to be no major problems in this area.
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f) the agency's formal and informal linkages with the
"policy-making" or "policy-enforcing" body:
This area is pretty well covered in the discussion on
interorganizational communication and enforcement activities.
Applying the questions from Van Meter and Van Horn:
a) Are the economic resources available within the implementing
jurisdiction (or organization) sufficient ro support
successful implementation?
As indicated in the discussion on policy resources, the
answer to this question is negative.
b) To what extent (and how) will prevailing economic and social
conditions be affected by the implementation of the policy
in question?
Aside from the costs incurred in compliance and enforcement,
the right to know law's effect on economic conditions will be
negligible.
c) What is the nature of public opinion; how salient is the
related policy issue?
Though the original proponents of the law included
representatives from "legitimate" public interest groups, one
does not get a feeling that there is any type of widespread
public support or opposition to right to know. As a matter of
fact, one might conclude that, if anything, the general public
is unaware of the law and the rights that it affords.
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d) Do elites favor or oppose implementation of the policy?
Casting employers in the role of "elites", one would
have to answer this question "neither". There remains a bit of
confusion and resistance on the part of individual employers, but
as a whole, industry seems to have accepted the law. Lobbyists
for industry managed to influence the law's formation to no small
extent (the confidentiality clause and the protracted process for
release of MSDS information to community residents). The
govenror's staff, in its concensus-building approach to
developing the law, managed to create a policy which neither
totally pleased nor totally offended the parties concerned.
e) What is the partisan character on the implementation
jurisdiction (or organization)?
This question is of minor relevance in the case of the right
to know law.
f) To what extent are private interest groups mobilized in
support or opposition to the policy?
The right to know law is the product of interest group
activity. The original proponents of the law came from outside
of what Nakamura and Smallwood refer to as the realm of
"legitimate" policy-makers. The greatest response to the
proposed policy also came from extra-governmental sources. The
government played the roles of mediator and implementer more than
originator.
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Van Meter and Van Horn describe three elements of
implementers' responses to policy: cognition, direction of
response, and intensity of response.
On the state level, disposition of the implementers seems to
present no problems. On the municipal level, however, things are
not quite as tranquil. For varying reasons described in Section
Two, a large number of municipal officials tend to harbor
negative responses to their assigned tasks. These feelings
manifest themselves to varying degrees, from grumbling partial
compliance to outright refusal to cooperate. This is not to say
that all municipalities are unhappy with the law's intent;
officials would just rather not have to be party to its
implementation.
After reviewing the preceding application of the right to
know law to Van Meter and Van Horn's Model of the Policy
Implementation Process, one cannot help but realize and
appreciate the fact that making a policy function smoothly is not
an easy or inevitable task. Myriad factors play roles affecting
the policy's eventual outcome.
It is also at this point that the chief failing of the Van
Meter and Van Horn model becomes apparent. There exist in this
model no provisions for feedback -- for the amelioration of
problems which arise during implementation. Unlike that of Smith
or Nakamura and Smallwood, the Van Meter and Van Horn model is
one-dimensional, with no mechanisms allowing for a full interplay
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of action between components. By viewing implementation as such
a single-minded undertaking, Van Meter and Van Horn ignore a
vital temporal dimension when considering the influence which
factors exert upon another. This becomes apparent when one
considers the possibility that the powers that be in right to
know (legislature, governor, department commissioners) may, upon
reviewing the problems associated with the implementation of the
law, opt to revamp fundamental characteristics of the program
(such as funding procedures and amounts).
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CONCLUSION
But what of the utility of applying Van Meter and Van Horn's
decidedly unreal model to the actuality of the right to know law?
Is this tack beneficial to one's understanding of the execution
of policy mandates? The answer would have to be a heavily-
qualified yes.
By studying the theory associated with the policy
implementation process, one becomes more aware of the factors
influencing eventual outcome. Viewing this vast chaotic mess
through others' eyes results in greater sensitivity in
understanding why actors in the implementation process behave as
they do. Van Meter and Van Horn's model is especially notable in
this regard in that it takes into account psychological aspects
of implementers previously ignored in the classical model.
One must be wary, however, of too openly embracing
theoretical models. The reality of implementation is much too
complex and sloppy to be conveniently explained with well-chosen
words and intellectual gamesmanship. Right to know is a good
example.
Upon examining the factors influencing right to know's
implementation, one is surprised to discover that the process has
not collapsed into one large, anarchistic mess. Why have state-
level implementers, neglected from above with inadequate staffing
and funds and buffeted from below by critics and rebellious
municipal personnel, simply not abandoned hope of effectively
executing their duties? Why do they do their best to ride out
the maelstrom?
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Perhaps the answer to that question lies in the classical
model and its concept of "blind obedience'. At some point the
implementer must divorce personal feelings from the task at hand
and proceed. The extent of this divorcing of feeling -- how long
it lasts, at what point in the implementation process it occurs,
what events or actions serve as triggers -- necessarily varies
from instance to instance and is doubtless much less extensive
than in the pure classical model.
Implementation cannot be adequately described by just one
model. One needs to be aware of numerous opinions and facts
pertaining to policy execution and use them as sources for
understanding. None will be perfect, but several will be useful.
Can this approach, applying theory to reality, be utilized
in determining a policy's eventual success or failure? Probably
not. The case of the right to know law's still operating despite
the presence of all of its negative factors points this out.
Models may help increase awareness of potential obstacles, but to
use them to predict a program's life or death is inappropriate
and dangerous.
Finally, the right to know law illustrates a very important
point: implementers need to be involved in the initial
formulation of policy. It is vital that those persons who must
execute the instructions of decision-makers -- those who are well
aware through day-to-day experience of the potentials and
limitations of the administrative system -- play active roles
early in the policy process. The use of these actors' knowledge
and experience from the start will help avoid later conflict.
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155
GLOSSARY
Carcinogen
a substance that tends to cause cancer.
CAS - Chemical Abstracts Service
an organization under the American Chemical Society; CAS
gathers information on and indexes chemicals and chemical
mixtures. This information is compiled into "chemical
abstracts" which are then assigned identifying "CAS
numbers".
CAS Number
the identification assigned by CAS to a specific chemical or
chemical mixture.
Community Resident
any resident of a municipality in which an employer
manufactures, process, uses or stores toxic or hazardous
substances listed on MSL.
DEQE - Department of Environmental Quality Engineering
one of three Massachusetts statewide regulatory agencies
which (with DPH and DLI) is charged with authority to
administer the right to know law.
Designated Representative
an employee's treating physician who had written
authorization from the employee; an employee's collective
bargaining agent who is certified, or is recognized by the
employer (does not need written employee authorization). No
other individual or organization may serve as a designated
representative.
DLI - Department of Labor and Industries
one of the three Massachusetts statewide regulatory agencies
which (with DEQE and DPH) is charged with authority to
administer the right to know law.
DPH - Department of Public Health
one of the three Massachusetts statewide regulatory agencies
which (with DEQE and DPH) is charged with authority to
administer the right to know law.
Employee
any individual employed on or after September 26, 1984 who
is, has been, or may be exposed under normal operating
conditions or foreseeable emergencies to a MSL substance in
the workplace. In the case of a deceased or legally
incapacitated employee, the employee's spouse, guardian, or
executor may exercise all of the employee's rights under the
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right to know law. Any individual whose employment was
terminated after 9/26/1984 is considered to be still an
employee.
Employer
any person, firm, corporation, or other entity engaged in a
business or in providing services, including the state
government and any lesser political juridictions, that
manufactures, processes, uses, or stores MSL substances.
This definition does not include employment of domestic
workers or casual employment at the place of residence of
the employer. Independent contractors are considered the
sole employer of their employee, even though the employees
may be performing work at the workplace of another.
Hazard Communication Standard
federal standard administered by OSHA regulating transmittal
to employees of information on substance hazard. The
transmittal is to be by labeling and other forms of warning,
MSDSs and employee training.
Hazardous Chemical
Defined in the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard as any
chemical which is a physical or health hazard.
Label
written, printed and graphic information displayed on or
affixed to the container of a MSL substance.
Manufacturer
any individual or company which produces, synthesizes,
extracts or otherwise makes a toxic or hazardous substances.
Medical Emergency
a serious medical condition which poses an imminent threat
to a person's health, caused, or suspected to have been
caused, by exposure to a toxic or hazardous substance, and
which requires immediate treatment by a physician.
MSDS - Material Safety Data Sheet
the basic information required by the right to know law; it
identifies a toxic or hazardous substance and its
manufacturer. The MSDS contains information relating to
risks associated with the substance and procedures for
eliminating or reducing those risks.
MSL - Massachusetts Substance List
a list of nearly 2000 chemical and chemical substances
identifying those covered by the right to know law. DPH
compiles the MSL, which is subject to periodic amendment.
Mutagen
a substance that tends to alter genetic material in a living
cell; one of the kinds of toxic or hazardous substances
covered by the right to know law.
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Neurotoxin
a substance that damages the nervous sytem; one of the kinds
of toxic or hazardous substances covered by the right to
know law.
NFPA - National Fire Protection Association
international organization established to promote and
improve fire protection. NFPA has developed a color-and-
number coding system which indicates the degree of hazard of
chemicals and mixtures created by short-term exposure as
might be encountered under fire or other emergency
situations.
OSHA -- Occupational Safety and Health Administration
federal agency, part of the U.S. Department of Labor, with
safety and health regulatory and enforcement authority for
most U.S. industry and business.
Teratogen
a substance that tends to cause birth defects; one of the
kinds of toxic or hazardous substances covered by the right
to know law.
Toxic Substance
any chemical substance or mixture of substances which is
listed in the MSL and which is manufactured, processed, used
or stored in the workplace.
Trade Name
the trademark name or commercial trade name for a material.
Trade Secret
any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information
which is used in an employer's or manufacturer's business,
and which the employer or manufacturer uses to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.
Work Area
a defined space, room, or other area where toxic or
hazardous substances are produced, used, or stored and where
employees are present during the course of their employment;
May include an entire workplace.
Workplace
establishment or business at which work is performed and
containing one or more work areas.
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